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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTING
JUVENILE AND MENTALLY RETARDED
OFFENDERS: A PRECEDENTIAL ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSAL FOR RECONSIDERATION
Although the eighth amendment has been a part of the United
States Constitution since 1791, the constitutional scope of the
amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments contin-
ues to provoke sharp debate.' Borrowed verbatim from the English
Bill of Rights of 1689, the eighth amendment provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." 2
 Commentators have suggested
that the American framers considered the cruel and unusual pun-
ishments clause constitutional "boilerplate." 3 Notwithstanding this
characterization, litigants have repeatedly petitioned the United
States Supreme Court to define the meaning of the clause, partic-
ularly in relation to the death penalty. 4
In its first 175 years, however, the United States Supreme Court
rarely interpreted the cruel and unusual punishments clause. 5 In
fact, it was not until 1879, almost one hundred years after the
amendment's adoption, that the Court first interpreted the clause
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969).
2 U.S. CoNs .r. amend. VIII; Granucci, supra note 1, at 840.
Granucci, supra note 1, at 840. In his Commentaries, Justice Story reasoned that the
eighth amendment was probably unnecessary in a free government because it was highly
unlikely that such a government would authorize or justify such "atrocious" conduct. J.
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE. CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 710 (1987) (abr. ed.
1833).
See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2980 (1989) (execution of juveniles);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2958 (1989) (execution of mentally retarded persons);
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (execution of insane person); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (execution of rapist).
E.g., Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARv. L.
REV. 1773, 1777 (1970).
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and its relation to the death penalty. 6 Consequently, most nineteenth
century commentators believed that the clause was an obsolete con-
stitutional provision.?
During this period of perceived obsolescence, the Court ad-
hered to what commentators now label the historical method of
interpretation!' Under this approach, the Court defined the mean-
ing of the cruel and unusual punishments clause in relation to the
views of the American framers of the eighth amendment. 9 As a
result, commentators note, the early Court interpreted the clause
as only prohibiting those punishments that the framers deemed
cruel and unusual in 1791. 10
The Court ceased this strict historical interpretation at the be-
ginning of the twentieth century." Subsequently, the Court has
interpreted the eighth amendment under what commentators now
label the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine.' 2 Under this
doctrine, the Court has primarily asked whether contemporary so-
ciety, rather than the eighth amendment's framers, abhors a partic-
ular punishment. 13
 Hence, the "evolving standards of decency" doc-
trine has defined the cruel and unusual punishments clause in
accordance with contemporary society's conceptions of cruelty.
The Court has not, however, developed a consistent mode of
constitutional analysis under the "evolving standards of decency"
6 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (death by public shooting not cruel
and unusual punishment).
The Wilkerson decision was only the second time that the Court had ever discussed the
cruel and unusual punishments clause. In the 1866 United States Supreme Court case of
Pervear v. Commonwealth, the Court held that the eighth amendment did not apply to state
action. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 479-80 (1867). In Pervear, the defendant argued that this
amendment prohibited the state from fining him fifty. dollars and sentencing him to three
months of hard labor for operating, without a license, an establishment that illegally sold
and stored intoxicating beverages. Id. at 480. The Court reasoned that even if the eighth
amendment restricted state action, the defendants argument had no merit because the
penalty imposed was a common punishment adopted in many states. Id. Therefore, the
Pervear Court established that the eighth amendment had no relevance to state-imposed
punishments and fines, but if it did, a sentence of hard labor for three months and a fine of
fifty dollars was not excessive, cruel, or unusual. Id.
Granucci, supra note 1, at 842; Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the
Substantive Criminal Law, 79 I-IAlt., . L. REV. 635, 637 (1966) (hereinafter Note, The Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause].
8 E.g., Berkman, Perspectives on the Death Penalty: Judicial Behavior and the Eighth Amendment,
I YALE L. Sc PoL'v REV. 41, 44 (1982).
Id. at 45.
is
" Granucci, supra note 1, at 842.
12 Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1778.
Is See Berkman, supra note 8, at 48.
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doctrine." Particularly in relation to the death penalty, the Court
has taken a number of different approaches to determine the valid-
ity of this punishment.' 5 For instance, under the contemporary
consensus approach, the Court has surveyed empirical data, such
as state death penalty legislation and jury sentencing behavior, to
ascertain whether contemporary society as a whole has rejected
capital punishment as unnecessarily cruel." Under other ap-
proaches, the Court has independently considered its justices' views
on whether the death penalty falls within the constitutional meaning
of cruelty." These independent approaches include proportionality
analysis, under which the Court has examined the gravity of a
particular crime to determine whether execution is a disproportion-
ate penalty, and utilitarian excessiveness analysis, under which the '
Court has considered whether execution accomplishes society's in-
terests in retribution and deterrence." Often, the Court has utilized
a combination of these techniques."
Each of these approaches has generated a significant amount
of debate. For example, commentators argue that the contemporary
consensus approach, with its focus on empirical data, renders the
eighth amendment a meaningless prohibition against the states be-
cause it allows the states themselves to define the meaning of the
cruel and unusual punishments clause. 2° On the other hand, some
Justices have argued that the amendment itself implicitly endorses
this approach because the amendment prohibits punishments that
are cruel and unusual. 2 ' These Justices also argue that the indepen-
dent approaches are improper judicial exercises because they consist
of the personal preferences of the individual Justices. 22 Not sur-
prisingly, the commentators and Justices favoring the independent .
proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness approaches argue that
14 Id. at 41-42.
15 Id. at 42.
16 Id.; see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-82 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell,
& Stevens, ,1J.) (state legislation and jury sentencing behavior did not indicate consensus
against death penalty).
" Berkman, supra note 8, at 66.
18 For an example of proportionality analysis, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-
98 (1977) (plurality opinion) (death penalty for rape). For an example of utilitarian cues.
siveness analysis, see Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798-801 (1982) (death penalty for
nontriggerman guilty of felony murder).
10 See, e,g„ Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-801.
" E.g., Berkman, supra note 8, at 48-49; Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1782.
21 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2979 (1989) (plurality opinion).
22 See id. at 2980.
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the Court must engage in these approaches if the eighth amend-
ment is to retain any meaning."
The Court, therefore, has struggled to find an appropriate
approach to eighth amendment adjudication with regard to capital
punishment.24
 This struggle has continued in the Court's treatment
of the constitutionality of executing juvenile and mentally retarded
offenders. In the 1988 United States Supreme Court case of Thomp-
son v. Oklahoma, a plurality of the Court, by utilizing a combination
of the contemporary consensus, proportionality, and utilitarian ex-
cessiveness approaches, held that the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause forbids the execution of a 15-year-old offender.25
Nevertheless, in the 1989 decisions of Stanford v. Kentucky, in which
the Court reviewed the death sentences of a 16 and a 17-year-old
offender, and Parry v. Lynaugh, in which the Court reviewed the
death sentence of a mentally retarded offender, a plurality of the
Court, by adhering only to the historical and contemporary consen-
sus approaches, held that the executions of these offenders could
proceed. 26 Hence, these 1989 decisions suggest that the Court may
modify its eighth amendment analysis in the future.
Consequently, this note analyzes this recent development in the
United States Supreme Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence
in light of the Court's prior cases concerning the cruel and unusual
punishments clause. Section I examines the evolution of the Court's
approaches to defining the clause, from the early Court's loyalty to
the historical method of interpretation through the Court's various
approaches under the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine, 27
Section I also discusses additional approaches to the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" doctrine that members of the Court have argued
are appropriate.28 Section II presents the Court's application of the
preceding approaches in the Thompson, Stanford, and Penry deci-
sions.29 Section III analyzes the Court's approaches to eighth
23 See, e.g., id. at 2986-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Berkman, supra note 8, at 77 (the
Supreme Court must approach cruel and unusual punishments issues independently to give
the eighth amendment substantive meaning).
2' Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1777; Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death:
Evolving Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989, 1002
(1978).
25
	 v, Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2691-2700 (1988).
26 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974-80; Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953-55, 2958
(1989).
27 See infra notes 32-193 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 194-256 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 257-461 and accompanying text.
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amendment interpretation in the death penalty context, demon-
strating that none of these approaches has adequately remedied the
Court's problems in this area." Section III also analyzes the Court's
treatment of juvenile and mentally retarded offender executions,
concluding that in these contexts, the Court should adopt a com-
pelling state interest/least restrictive means approach to determine
the constitutionality of their sentences."
I. EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT'S CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE
Prior to the twentieth century, the United States Supreme
Court had little occasion to interpret the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause of the eighth amendment." Throughout the nine-
teenth century, most commentators accepted the clause's obsoles-
cence." Contemporary commentators note a number of factors that
may have contributed to the historical dormancy of the clause.
One factor that these commentators suggest may have contrib-
uted to the clause's historical dormancy is that most early American
jurists interpreted the clause as a mere prohibition on the "barbar-
ities" of Stuart England." These early American jurists reasoned,
commentators argue, that because the framers of the eighth amend-
ment borrowed it from the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the
framers intended the clause to prohibit only torturous modes of
punishment such as "pillorying, disemboweling, decapitation, and
drawing and quartering."s 5 Commentators suggest, therefore, that
because those sorts of torturous punishments were never common-
place in America, this early interpretation of the clause contributed
to its historical desuetude in the courts."
3° See infra notes 462-79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 480-526 and accompanying text.
"See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1777 & n.17 (Court discussed cruel and
unusual punishments clause only ten times before 1970).
33 Granucci, supra note 1, at 842; Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, supra
note 7, at 637,
Granucci, supra note 1, at 842; see Berkman, supra note 8, at 44. The "barbarities"
practiced in Stuart England included physically torturous punishments such as the iron boot,
the thumbscrew, the rack, breaking on the wheel, drawing and quartering, and crucifixion.
Berkman, supra note 8, at 44; see O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting) (cruel and unusual usually applied to punishments that inflict torture).
33 Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, supra note 7, at 637; see also Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 389-90 (1910) (the framers intended the cruel and unusual
punishments clause to prohibit the "atrocious, sanguinary and inhuman" punishments of the
past).
Granucci, supra note 1, at 842; see also Weems, 217 U.S. at 395 (White, J., dissenting)
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e.	 Commentators also suggest that the courts' failure to develop
workable constitutional standards with which to interpret the clause
contributed to its dormancy. 37
 They note that the United States
Supreme Court has always been uncomfortable with the general
language of the clause, and that the early Court therefore never
attempted to detail the exact scope of the clause. 38
 Additionally,
they note that because the Court did not hold the cruel and unusual
punishments clause to apply to the states until 1962, eighth amend-
ment claims were rare during the Court's first 175 years. 39
Although the Court has interpreted the cruel and unusual
,punishments clause with increasing frequency during the twentieth
century, scholars argue that eighth amendment doctrine remains
underdeveloped. 40 These scholars reason that this underdevelop-
ment is a result of the Court's confusion concerning its role in
interpreting the clause. 4 ' They contend that underdevelopment of
cruel and unusual punishment doctrine is a serious problem because
two of the most important functions of the Supreme Court are its
respect for precedent and its dedication to principled decision-
maki ng.42
(prior to the formation of the United States Constitution, Americans were no longer con-
•;cerned with the English Bill of Rights' protection against cruel and unusual punishments
because in general, the punishments of the past were no longer imposed).
.	
]7
	 Note, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by
the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996, 996 (1964).
3, See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1777 n.16; see also Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 99 (1958) (plurality opinion) (noting that the Court had not detailed the precise
scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual"); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130,
135-36 (1878) (noting the difficulty in exactly defining the scope of the cruel and unusual
punishments clause).
39
 Radin, supra note 24, at 997 & n.28 (Court rarely discussed cruel and unusual punish-
•ments clause before it applied the clause to the states in 1962); see Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (state statute making it a misdemeanor punishable by impris-
onment to be addicted to narcotics was cruel and unusual within the meaning of the eighth
and fourteenth amendments).
4°
 Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1777; Radin, supra note 24, at 1002; see, e.g.,
Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989);
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1972).
41 Radin, supra note 24, at 1002; see Goldberg Sc Dershowitz, supra note.. .5, at 1777 (courts
have failed to develop constitutional standards for interpreting cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause).
42
 See Berkman, supra note 8, at 65 (because the legitimacy and persuasive power of the
Court turns on the reasoning of its published opinions, poorly reasoned opinions do not
fulfill .
 these goals); Goldberg Sc Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1777 (although respect for
rt precedent and principled decision-making constrains constitutional interpretation, estab-
lished principles and precedent are sparse under the cruel and unusual punishments clause).
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The remainder of this section will outline and discuss a number
of the Court's different approaches to interpreting the cruel and
unusual punishments clause. The scope of each approach will be
defined and placed within the framework of constitutional adjudi-
cation of the eighth amendment. The remainder of this section will
also discuss the merits of each approach as the Court and commen-
tators have defined them.
A. The Historical Method
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the cruel
and unusual punishments clause in relation to the death penalty
almost one hundred years after the states ratified the eighth amend-
ment." In the 1879 case of Wilkerson v. Utah, the United States
Supreme Court held that death by public shooting was not cruel
and unusual punishment for murder in the first degree." After
interpreting the governing statutes to authorize public shooting as
a permissible mode of punishment, the Court reasoned that this
mode of execution was constitutional because it was historically
accepted." Therefore, the Court established that death by public
shooting was not a cruel and unusual punishment within the mean-
ing of the eighth amendment."
In Wilkerson, a jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree
murder.47 The trial judge then sentenced the defendant to death
by public shooting. 48 The defendant appealed his sentence on the
basis that the trial judge had sentenced him under a statutory
provision of the Territory of Utah that Congress had repealed."
In particular, an 1852 Act of the Territory of Utah permitted
execution by public shooting. 5° An 1876 Act of the•Territory, how-
ever, provided only that first degree murderers should suffer death,
and contained a provision that repealed all prior acts inconsistent
with the provisions of the 1876 Act.51 Thus, the defendant con-
tended that his sentence was improper because no statutory provi-
sion authorized the mode of his execution. 52
48 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879).
44 Id. at 134-35.
45 1d. at 132-37.
46 Id. at 136
-
37.
47 Id. at 130.
48 Id. at 131.
49 1d. at 132.
89 Id.
81 Id.
52 See id.
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In holding that death by public shooting was a permissible
punishment, the Wilkerson Court noted that the legislature had the
authority to proscribe punishment subject to the cruel and unusual
punishments clause of the eighth amendment. 53 It then observed
that shooting was a common form of military punishment, and that
the common law provided for additional modes of execution, such
as public dissection and drawing and quartering." Consequently,
the Court reasoned that although the precise scope of the eighth
amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishments
was difficult to define, it was safe to confirm that the amendment
forbade only torturous punishments such as those allowed under
the common law. 55
 Therefore, because death by public shooting was
not uncommon in England or the United States, the Court reasoned
that the eighth amendment did not invalidate the defendant's death
sentence. 56
Commentators label the Court's approach in Wilkerson the his-
torical method of interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments
clause. 57
 Under this approach, commentators note, the Court inter-
prets the clause in relation to the views of the American framers of
the eighth amendment. 58
 Scholars contend that because the framers
borrowed the cruel and unusual punishments clause verbatim from
the English Bill of Rights of 1689, the American framers interpreted
the clause to prohibit only what the English Puritans considered to
be torturous or barbarous punishments in 1689. 59
 Hence, commen-
tators note that the historical method of interpretation seeks to
restrict the clause's meaning to a prohibition against only those
forms of punishments that the American framers of the eighth
amendment considered torturous or barbarous at the time of the
amendment's adoption. 6°
" Id. at 133.
54 Id. at 134-35,137.
" Id. at 135-36.	 •
" Id. at 134-35.
" E.g., Berkman, supra note 8, at 44. For another early example of the Court's historical
approach to the cruel and unusual punishments clause, see In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436,
446-47 (1890) (death by electrocution).
" Berkman, supra note 8, at 44.
" See, e.g., Granucci, supra note I, at 840; Radin, supra note 24, at 1031. Most scholars
suggest that the English passed their Bill of Rights primarily to prohibit the infamous tortures
of the Stuart reign. Granucci, supra note 1, at 840. In his article, however, Granucci suggests
that instead of intending to prohibit the atrocities of the Stuart reign, the English framers
intended to prohibit unauthorized punishments and disproportionate penalties generally. Id.
at 860.
60 Berkman, supra note 8, at 44. The eighth amendment was adopted in 1791. Granucci,
supra note 1, at 840.
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One advantage of the historical method for the Court, scholars
suggest, is that the method helps to provide conclusive answers to
questions posed under the cruel and unusual punishments clause. 6 '
This approach, they observe, also allows the Court to avoid conflict
with the other branches of government, because it allows legislatures
to choose any penalty short of physical torture.62 Scholars also argue
that the historical method tends to legitimize the Court by freeing
its Justices from having to inject their own personal beliefs of what
is cruel and unusual into the clause. 63
Commentators also cite a number of disadvantages to the his-
torical method of interpretation. One such disadvantage is the pos-
sibility that the clause's framers did not intend for its meaning to
be frozen in time." If the framers intended for the clause's meaning
to change in relation to society's conception of cruelty, a reading of
the clause supported by its general language, scholars argue that
the framers' conceptions of cruelty are irrelevant.65 Scholars also
criticize the historical method of interpretation for its failure to
recognize the possibility that notions of cruelty change over time."
Finally, they note that taking a pure historical approach to the cruel
and unusual punishments clause substantially limits the circum-
stances in which the Court will invoke the eighth amendment be-
cause it is unlikely that an American legislature would authorize
torturous punishments. 67
Supreme Court opinions discussing the death penalty still pe-
riodically contain the argument that the historical approach is the
only legitimate approach to the cruel and unusual punishments
clause." The Court, however, rejected the historical approach as its
sole interpretative guide in 1910 by adopting a more expanded view
'/t Berkman, supra note 8, at 46.
62 Id. at 46-47.
63
 Id. at 45.
" Id. at 47.
" Id.
Id.
Radin, supra note 24, at 997; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 430 (1972)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (no American legislature would today tolerate punishments of our
colonial era such as "pillorying, branding, or cropping or nailing of the ears").
"See, e.g., Woodson v. California, 428 U.S. 280, 308 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(stating that the framers might have intended to limit the scope of the cruel and unusual
punishments clause to those punishments American society deemed cruel and unusual when
it adopted the Bill of Rights); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J.,
concurring) (the cruel and unusual punishments clause did not prohibit capital punishment
because at the time of the eighth amendment's adoption, the laws of this country, and of
"our ancestors"' countries, commonly authorized that penalty).
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of the clause. 69 This expanded view is now known as the "evolving
standards of decency" doctrine. 70
B. The "Evolving Standards of Decency" Doctrine
Under the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine, members
of the United States Supreme Court have applied varying interpre-
tations to the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth
amendment. 7 ' In some cases, commentators note, the Court has
sought to define the scope of the eighth amendment's proscription
by ascertaining contemporary society's views on the punishment in
question. 72
 The Court has also attempted to define the scope of the
clause independently, however, by considering the individual Jus-
tices' views on a particular punishment. 73
 At times, the Court has
applied a combination of these techniques. 74
It was not until 1910, in Weems v. United States, that a majority
of the United States Supreme Court expanded the originally ac-
cepted meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments clause. 75 In
Weems, the Court held that a 15-year sentence of cadena temporal, a
punishment of Spanish origin that subjected the prisoner to hard
and painful labor, the wearing of chains on his wrists and ankles,
and the perpetual loss of civil liberties, was cruel and unusual pun-
ishment." The prisoner, an officer of the United States Government
of the Phillipine Islands, received this punishment for falsifying a
single public document." The Court noted that cadena temporal was
unusual in that there was no similar sentence in American legisla-
tion." The Court then expanded the clause's meaning by reasoning
Granucci, supra note 1, at 843. It should be noted, however, that Justice Field first
argued for a more expansive view of the clause. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-
40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that in addition to prohibiting torturous punishments,
the cruel and unusual punishments clause prohibited punishments that were greatly dispro-
portionate to the offense charged because of excessive length or severity).
70 See, e.g., Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1778; Radin, supra note 24, at 1032-
33.
71 See, e.g., Berkman, supra note 8, at 41-42; Radin, supra note 24, at 1002-13.
72 See, e.g., Berkman, supra note 8, at 48; Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1779-
81.
79
 Berkman, supra note 8, at 66, 69.
71 See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593-600 (1977) (plurality opinion); Enmund
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-801 (1982).
76
 2 1 7 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
76 Id. at 363-64, 382. In Weems, the provision at issue was the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause of the Phillipine Bill of Rights, which was taken from the United States Con-
stitution. Id. at 367. The Court stated that the provision had the same meaning as that
contained in the eighth amendment. Id.
77 Id. at 357-58.
76 Id. at 377.
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that the clause was "not fastened to the obsolete" but might "acquire
new meaning as public opinion [became] enlightened by a humane
justice." 79 By reasoning that this punishment was excessive in rela-
tion to the prisoner's offense, and therefore cruel and unusual, the
Court established that the extent or severity of a punishment, and
not only its historical acceptance, may render it unconstitutional."
In the 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles, the United States Supreme
Court again applied an expansive reading of the clause, and held
that denationalization was cruel and unusual punishment. 8 ' In Trop,
the defendant, a United States army private serving in French
Morocco in World War II, received his sentence for war-time de-
sertion. 82 In analyzing the defendant's punishment under the eighth
amendment, the Court stated that the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 83 The
Trop Court thus established that the substantive meaning of the
clause may vary over time."
In its analysis, the Trop Court first noted that prior judicial
interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishments clause was
sparse." It then stated that "nothing less than the dignity of man"
was the underlying principle of the eighth amendment, and that
the amendment stood to assure that civilized standards limited the
nature of punishments. 86 Moreover, the Court noted that there was
a fundamental right to citizenship, and reasoned that this mandated
the Court to examine the safeguard of the eighth amendment with
"special diligence."87 Against this backdrop, the Court concluded
that the eighth amendment barred the punishment of denationali-
zation because that punishment offended the "cardinal principles
for which the Constitution stands." 88
75 1d. at 378.
86 Id, at 378, 380-82; see also Goldberg, The Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15 ARIZ.
L. REV. 355, 359 (1973).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102-03 (1958) (plurality opinion).
82 Id, at 87. The defendant, by court-martial, was dishonorably discharged and sentenced
to three years of hard labor, as well as forfeiture of all pay and allowances. Id. at 88. Upon
applying for a passport a number of years later, the defendant learned that he had also lost
his United States citizenship by reason of his dishonorable discharge and conviction. Id.
83 Id. at 101.
" See Radin, supra note 24, at 1033.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (plurality opinion).
66 Id. at 100.
tr7 Id. at 103.
68 Id. at 102. The Court elaborated on the character of denationalization as follows:
(Denationalization] subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and
distress. He knows not what discriminations may be established against him,
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Since Trop, the Court has continued to state that the eighth
amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 89 Com-
mentary suggests that the Court has subsequently repeated this
phrase so often that the phrase has acquired a life of its own. 9° In
no case after Trop has a majority of the Court rejected this inter-
pretation of the clause. 9 ' Commentators suggest that this reflects
the Court's acceptance of the notion that concepts of cruelty may
change over time. 92
 They note, however, that the Court has taken
varying approaches to determining the "evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of maturing society."98 Under one of
these approaches, the Court has sought to define the "evolving
standards of decency" by focusing on empirical data thought to
reflect society's views on a particular punishment. Under other
approaches, commentators note, the Court has sought to define the
"evolving standards of decency" independently, by considering the
views of its individual Justices. 95
1. The Contemporary Consensus Approach
Commentators refer to one of the United States Supreme
Court's approaches to determining the "evolving standards of de-
cency" as the contemporary consensus approach. 98 Commentators
observe that under this approach, the Court examines "objective
indicia," such as legislative enactments and jury sentencing behavior,
what proscriptions may be ,directed against him, and when and for what cause
his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to
banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a
condition deplored in the international community of democracies. It is no
answer to suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be
brought to bear on a stateless person. The threat makes the punishment ob-
noxious.
Id.
°9 1d. at 101; see, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2974 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (execution of juveniles); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2953 (1989) (opinion
of O'Connor, J.) (execution of mentally retarded person); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
406 (1986) (execution of insane person); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (medical
attention to prison inmate).
Radin, supra note 24, at 1033.
For recent examples of cases where the Court continued to use the "evolving standards
of decency" doctrine, see Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974; Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2953.
" Radin, supra note 24, at 1033.
" See id. at 1002-13.
94
 Berkman, supra note 8, at 43, 48.
See, e.g., id. at 66-67.
96 Berkman, supra note 8, at 48.
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to determine contemporary society's views on a particular punish-
ment. 97 The underlying reasoning of this approach, scholars argue,
is that the approach allows the Justices to avoid imposing their
subjective views into the meaning of the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause." These scholars note that because the contemporary
consensus approach relies on empirical data, it is similar to the
historical approach discussed above.99
The 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgia is an example of the United
States Supreme Court's application of the contemporary consensus
approach.m In Gregg, the Court held that the death penalty, as
punishment for murder, does not invariably violate the eighth
amendment. 191 At issue in Gregg was the constitutionality of Geor-
gia's death penalty statute, under which the trial court had sen-
tenced the defendant to death for armed robbery and murder. 192
The Court, by reasoning that empirical data, such as state death
penalty legislation and jury sentencing behavior, did not reflect the
notion that contemporary society had rejected the death penalty as
cruel and unusual, established that a sentence of death was permis-
sible under the eighth amendment.'"
The first empirical data that the Gregg Court considered was
the death penalty legislation of all the states, data the Court rea-
soned was the most marked indication of society's endorsement or
rejection of the death penalty.'" To support its . reasoning, the Court
noted that in a democracy the legislatures, not the courts, are "con-
stituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of
the people."'" Noting that specifications of punishments are unique
legislative policy issues, the Court reasoned that it owed a high
degree of deference to the legislature. t 06 The Court then observed
97 Id. For the first case where the Court took the contemporary consensus approach and
labeled these factors "objective," see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,173 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.).
96 Berkman, supra note 8, at 48.
"Id. See supra notes 43-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical
approach.
1 °0 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-82 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.); Berkman,
supra note 8, at 48.
'°' Gregg, 428 U.S. at 168-69 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.).
192 Id. at 161-62.
10 id. at 179-82,186-87.
Id. at 179-80.
"Id. at 175-76 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,383 (1972) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting)).
'so IV. at 176.
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that at least thirty-five states authorized the death penalty for certain
crimes resulting in death to the victim. 1 °7
The Court also considered jury sentencing behavior in its at-
tempt to ascertain the public's attitudes towards capital punish-
ment.'" The Court reasoned that because juries were directly in-
volved with sentencing persons to death, juries were another reliable
indicator of contemporary society's views on capital punishment.'"
Although it noted that juries imposed the death penalty with relative
infrequency, the Court reasoned that this might reflect the public's
opinion that criminals deserve the death penalty only in extreme
cases."°
Consequently, the Court reasoned that jury sentencing behav-
ior, like state death penalty legislation, supported the notion that a
large portion of society approved of capital punishment."' Al-
though the Court went on to consider a number of other ap-
proaches in its analysis, commentators suggest that the Court relied
heavily on this empirical data in reaching its holding." 2
 The Court
has subsequently looked at state death penalty legislation and jury
sentencing behavior in a number of death penalty challenges." 3
Scholars have suggested a number of advantages to the contem-
porary consensus approach. For instance, they contend that like the
historical approach, the contemporary consensus approach prevents
the Justices from having to inject their own personal beliefs into
the decision-making process." 4
 Scholars note that under this
method, the Court can instead purport to allow society to interpret
'" Id. at 179-80.
'0 Id. at 181.
"19 Id.; see also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968) (one of a jury's
most important functions is to preserve a link between present societal values and the penal
system).
"° Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens,
" I Id.
"? See Berkman, supra note 8, at 48; Radin, supra note 24, at 1035.
" 3 See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2975-79 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2955 (1989); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408
(1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-96 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
593-97 (1977) (plurality opinion).
" 4 Berkman, supra note 8, at 48; Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1779-80. In
a number of cases, the Court itself has explicitly noted its concern over injecting the Justices'
personal beliefs into the decision-making process. See, e.g., Co/ter, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality
opinion) ("Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the sub-
jective views of individual justices [therefore, the Court's] judgment should be informed
by objective factors to the maximum possible extent.").
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the amendment." 5 These scholars argue that the contemporary
consensus approach helps to provide the Court with conclusive
answers to questions posed under the cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause. 116 They also observe that when the Court takes this
approach, it decreases its chances of conflicting with other branches
of government." 7 Finally, scholars suggest that the contemporary
consensus approach avoids the stranglehold of the historical ap-
proach because it allows the Court to reject the moral judgments of
the past while remaining faithful to the text of the amendment. 18
On the other hand, commentators suggest that the contempo-
rary consensus approach has a number of disadvantages. For ex-
ample, they argue that the purpose of constitutional safeguards is
to prevent political majorities from violating previously settled prin-
ciples. "9 They contend, therefore, that if the Court allows majorities
to define what is cruel and unusual, the Court is eviscerating the
eighth amendment. 12° Scholars also criticize the contemporary con-
sensus approach for its circularity.m They consider it improper for
the Court to form constitutional doctrine based upon the acts of
other governmental branches, when the Constitution requires that
the Court limit those branches.' 22
As Gregg illustrates, when the Court attempts to define the
proscription of the eighth amendment under the contemporary
consensus strand of the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine,
the Court relies on empirical data such as state death penalty leg-
islation and jury sentencing behavior. 123 Although some members
of the Court may prefer this approach because it allows them to
avoid injecting their own beliefs into the meaning of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause, commentators suggest that the con-
temporary consensus approach, in its purest form, renders the
eighth amendment a meaningless prohibition against the states.'"
The Court, however, has continued to utilize this approach, at least
112 See Berkman, supra note 8, at 50.
Hold.
117 Id.
112 See id. at 49; Radin, supra note 24, at 1032.
III Berkman, supra note 8, at 49.
110 Id.
"L Radin, supra note 24, at 1036.
122 Id.
In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,179-82 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens,
JJ')•
124 See, e.g., Berkman, supra note 8, at 48-49; Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at
1779-80.
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in part, when considering the constitutionality of the death pen-
alty.' 25
2. Independent Judicial Approaches
In some cases, the Court has noted that its Justices' views do
have a role in the determination of what is cruel and unusual under
the clause.' 26
 Scholars suggest that when the Court uses the views
of its Justices to define the scope of the clause, the Court is taking
an approach to determination of the "evolving standards of de-
cency" that is independent of the views of society as reflected in
death penalty legislation and jury sentencing behavior. 127 Commen-
tators observe that under these approaches, the individual Justices
attempt to use their independent judgment to define the concept
of cruelty. 128
 These approaches, commentators argue, reject the
notion that either the eighth amendment's framers or contemporary
society's views solely define the clause.' 29
 Additionally, they argue
that when the Court engages in these approaches, it is actively
accepting its role as guardian of constitutional values.'"
The Court's independent approaches to defining the "evolving
standards of decency" include proportionality analysis's' and con-
cepts of utilitarian excessiveness.'s 2
 One member of the Court has
also considered the scope of the eighth amendment's prohibition
under a normative approach.'" Some members of the Court have
'" See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2975-79 (1989) (plurality opinion);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2955 (1989); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408
(1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-96 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
593-97 (1977) (plurality opinion).
I" See, e.g., Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 ("Although the judgments of legislatures, juries,
and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us to ultimately judge whether the
Eighth Amendment permits the imposition of the death penalty."); Colter, 493 U.S. at 597
(plurality opinion) ("[T]he attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries do not wholly
determine [what is cruel and unusual], for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our
own judgment will be brought to bear on the question .. ."); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174 (opinion
of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens,11.) (although the Court must interpret the eighth amendment
with an awareness of the Court's limited role, the Justices do have some role because the
amendment restricts legislative power).
127
 Berkman, supra note 8, at 66.
'" /d.
129 Id.
130 Id.
' 3 ' See infra notes 136-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of proportionality
analysis.
'" See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text for a discussion of utilitarian exces-
siveness analysis.
'" See infra notes 194-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of the normative
approach.
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suggested that the proper method of interpretation should include
a compelling state interest/least restrictive means test similar to that
used in relation to the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment.'" The common element in each of
these approaches, commentators suggest, is that the Justices' con-
sider their own individual beliefs when considering the constitu-
tionality of a punishment."'
a. Proportionality Analysis
Commentators describe proportionality analysis as an inquiry
into the relationship between a particular crime and a particular
punishment, 166 They state that when the Court performs propor-
tionality analysis, it seeks to determine when a criminal deserves a
particular punishment for his or her crime.'" This approach, com-
mentators contend, rests on notions of moral blameworthiness.'"
Members of the Court have noted that the Court has performed
proportionality analysis when considering the application of the
death penalty to particular crimes or classes of offenders.'"
For example, in the 1977 case of Coker v. Georgia, a plurality of
the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty as a
punishment for rape is grossly disproportionate to that crime, and
hence, unconstitutional."° In Coker, the defendant, after having
escaped from prison, raped a young woman in the presence of her
husband."' At the time of his escape, the defendant was serving a
number of sentences for murder, rape, kidnapping, and aggravated
assault. 142 At trial, the jury's verdict recommended death by elec-
trocution."3 By reasoning that this sentence was unconstitutionally
severe in relation to the defendant's offense, the Court established
134 See infra notes 211-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of compelling state
interest/least restrictive means analysis.
"6 Berkman, supra note 8, at 66-67,
"6 /d, at 67.
"7 Id. at 68-69.
138 Id. at 69.
" See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2955 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.); see also
id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For early cases mentioning
proportionality analysis in relation to punishments other than the death penalty, see Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) and O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
140 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
111 Id. at 587.
/42 id
147 Id. at 591.
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that the eighth amendment prohibits punishments that are dispro-
portionate to the crime committed.'"
In its analysis, the Court first observed that Georgia was the
only jurisdiction imposing the death sentence for the rape of an
adult woman. 145 It reasoned that although the state legislatures were
not wholly unanimous, this fact weighed heavily against the appro-
priateness of capital punishment for rape. 146 It also noted that in
the vast majority of cases, Georgia juries had not imposed the death
penalty for rape."' The Court stated, however, that these objective
indicia did not decide the controversy. 148
The Court prefaced its proportionality analysis by noting "the
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will
be brought to bear on the question." 1 q 9 It then acknowledged the
seriousness of the crime of rape by noting the physical and psycho-
logical pain that rape victims experience, and the injury to the
community's sense of security.' 5° The Court reasoned, however, that
rape, despite its seriousness, is not as serious as murder because
rape does not involve the unjustified taking of human life.'" Fur-
thermore, the Court reasoned that because of the death penalty's
uniquely severe and irrevocable quality, the death penalty is an
excessive penalty for rape. 152
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment of the Court, and
agreed with the Coker plurality's analysis to the extent that the death
penalty ordinarily is a disproportionate punishment for rape)• He
argued, however, that the plurality's holding was too broad because,
in cases of aggravated rape, the death penalty might indeed be
proportionate. 154 Therefore, Justice Powell argued that a more care-
144 Id. at 592 & n.4.
145
 Id. at 595-96.
146 Id. at 596.
147
 Id. at 597.
148
149 Id.
"0 Id. at 597-98.
' 5 ' Id. at 598. The Court elaborated as follows:
Although [rape] may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does
not include the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The
murderer kills; the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the
victim of the murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as
it was, but it is not over and normally is not beyond repair.
Id.
152 Id.
' 5' Id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
154 Id. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In his dissenting
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ful inquiry of the objective indicators of society's "evolving standards
of decency" was necessary to determine the constitutionality of the
death penalty for the crime of aggravated rape: 55
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented.' 56
He argued that the plurality's reasoning had overstepped the
bounds of proper constitutional adjudication because the plurality
had replaced the policy judgment of the state legislature with the
views of the individual Justices: 57 The plurality's reasoning was
faulty, Burger contended, because it focused upon the "bare fact"
that murder always resulted in death, although rape did not.' 58 He
also argued that the plurality had failed to explain the relevance
and constitutional significance of this distinction: 59 Thus, in Burg-
er's opinion, the plurality's proportionality analysis was improper: 6°
Another example of the United States Supreme Court's pro-
portionality analysis is the 1982 case of Enmund v. Florida.' 6 ' In
Enmund, the Court held that the death penalty is a disproportionate
punishment for one who neither took life, attempted to take life,
nor intended to take life: 62 A jury had convicted the defendant, an
alleged participant in a robbery that resulted in the death of an
elderly couple, of two counts of first-degree murder and one count
of robbery, and the trial judge had sentenced the defendant to
death:63 The Florida State Supreme Court upheld the defendant's
sentence under the felony-murder rule, which renders a felon re-
sponsible for the lethal acts of a co-felon, despite that court's finding
that the record supported no more than the inference that the
defendant was waiting in the escape car: 64 The United States Su-
opinion in Furman v. Georgia, Justice Powell had also considered the appropriateness of the
death penalty for rape. 408 U.S. 238, 456-61 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting). In Furman,
Powell argued that the proportionality test should be used to determine the constitutionality
of executing a rapist on a case-by-case basis, but only in the "rare case in which the death
penalty is rendered for a crime technically falling within the legislatively defined class but
factually falling outside the likely legislative intent in creating the category." Id. at 461 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
155 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
166 Coker, 439 U.S. at 604 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
157 Id.
' 5 ' Id. at 619 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
159 1d,
166 Id,
161 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
162 Id. at 797.
163 Id. at 783-85.
16, Id. at 786.
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preme Court reasoned that the defendant's sentence was excessive
because the defendant himself had not killed, attempted to kill, or
intended to kill.' 65 Thus, the Court established that the death pen-
alty is a disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional, punish-
ment for a robber in these circumstances.' 66
As in Colter, the Enmund Court first reviewed empirical evidence
of the "evolving standards of decency" to ascertain society's view of
the appropriateness of the sentence of death for a robber who
neither took life, attempted to take life, nor intended to take life.' 67
In particular, the Court noted that of the thirty-six state and federal
jurisdictions that authorized the death penalty, only eight jurisdic-
tions authorized that penalty for a robber who merely participated
in a robbery in which another robber took a life.' 68 The Enmund
Court also noted that a survey of all the reported appellate court
decisions since 1954 revealed that out of a total of 362 executions,
only six nontriggermen felony-murderers had been executed. 169 in
addition, the defendant was one of only three individuals in the
nation that was currently on death row who had not been adjudged
to have participated in a scheme designed to kill the victim.'" This
evidence, the Court reasoned, indicated that most legislatures and
juries had rejected the death penalty for accomplice liability in
felony murders."'
Again as in Coker, the Enmund Court noted that although such
empirical evidence weighed heavily in the balance, it was for the
Court ultimately to judge whether the death penalty was dispro-
portionate to the defendant's crime. 172 Following the same line of
analysis as the Court in Coker, the Enmund Court reasoned that
robbery, by definition, does not include serious injury or death to
the victim.'" Therefore, the Court reasoned that the death penalty,
in light of its severity and irrevocability, is an excessive penalty for
a robber who did not take human life.' 74
'" Id. at 797.
166 Id.
162 Id. at 789-96.
166 Id. at 789.
189
	 at 794. All six of these executions occurred in 1955. Id. at 794-95.
' 70 Id. at 795.
171 Id. at 797.
"2 Id.
122 Id.
124 Id. Following Enmund, the Court held in the 1987 case of Tison v. Arizona that if a
nontriggerperson substantially participates in a felony and shows reckless indifference to
human life, a state may impose the death penalty. 481 U.S. 137,158 (1987).
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The underlying principle in the Coker and Enmund Courts'
proportionality analysis, commentators suggest, is one of individual
criminal responsibility. 175 This 'type of analysis can involve two de-
terminations.'" The Court can determine whether the punishment
exceeds the crime, as the Court did in both Coker and Enmund.'"
The Court can also focus on the nexus between the mental state
and criminal culpability of the actor, as the Court did in Enmund.'"
Commentators contend that proportionality analysis is an example
of an independent approach to the determination of the "evolving
standards of decency" because under this approach, the members
of the Court use their own judgment to define the constitutional
concept of cruelty.' 79
b. Utilitarian Excessiveness Analysis
Utilitarian excessiveness analysis, the Court and commentators
suggest, is another independent judicial approach to the determi-
nation of the "evolving standards of decency." 8° The Coker Court,
in addition to stating that a punishment is excessive and unconsti-
tutional if "grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime,"
also stated that a punishment is excessive and unconstitutional if it
"makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punish-
ment and hence, is nothing more than the purposeless and needless
imposition of pain and suffering." 181 Commentators note that under
the utilitarian excessiveness approach, the Court's judicial process
becomes a means/ends analysis.' 82 They suggest that this concept
makes it necessary for the Court to attempt to determine the utility
of a punishment in relation to legitimate penal purposes. 183 Mem-
bers of the Court have noted that the Court has considered this
strand of eighth amendment analysis when deciding the death pen-
alty's application to certain crimes and classes of offenders.' 84
178 See Berkman, supra note 8, at 70 (underlying principle of Coker is individual criminal
responsibility).
178 See Casenote, The Supreme Court and Tison v. Arizona: A Capital Example of Judicial
Unsoundness, 29 B.C.L. REV. 969, 998-99 (1988).
177 See ill, at 999.
178 See id.
178 See Berkman, supra note 8, at 66.
to° See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion); Berkman, supra
note 8, at 67-68.
181 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion).
182 Berkman, supra note 8, at 67-68.
188 /d. at 68.
1 " See Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2955 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.); see also
ed. at 2959 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Commentators note, however, that the Court has rarely used
this approach.' 85 They argue that this is because of the difficulty in
resolving how effectively criminal punishments serve the penal goals
of society, a resolution that the utility concept demands. 188 For
instance, in Gregg, the Court observed that the death penalty's two
principle purposes were "retribution and deterrence of capital
crimes by prospective offenders."'" The Gregg Court, however,
noted that the utility of capital punishment as a deterrent was a
complex factual issue and its resolution was a matter better suited
for the legislature to resolve.' 88
Commentary suggests that these sorts of concerns make the
utility concept unworkable.' 89 The Enmund Court, however, rea-
soned that the imposition of the death penalty on a robber who did
not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill was unlikely to deter future
crimes of a similar nature because the possibility of the death sen-
tence in that situation would not enter into the mind of the of-
fender.' 9° The Enmund Court also reasoned that the appropriate-
ness of retribution for justification of capital punishment depended
on the degree of culpability of the offender, a degree in that case
that did not support the justification.' 9 ' Furthermore, critics of the
death penalty continue to argue against its constitutionality by pres-
enting evidence against the death penalty's utility. 192 In particular,
Justices Brennan and Marshall maintain that one of the reasons the
death penalty is unconstitutional is that is does not adequately serve
penal goals.'" Some members of the Court, therefore, believe that
one appropriate method of eighth amendment analysis under the
"evolving standards of decency" is the utilitarian excessiveness ap-
proach.
185 Berkman, supra note 8, at 68.
188 1d.
187 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens,
J J.). In Gregg, the Court also stated that the prevention of future crimes, accomplished by
the incapacitation of dangerous offenders, was another purpose of the death penalty that
other courts had discussed. Id. at 183 n.28.
188 id. at 186.
L89 Berkman, supra note 8, at 68.
199 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982).
' 91 /d. at 800-01.
'' For recent studies that found that the death penalty did not serve various utilitarian
purposes, see The Death Penalty Approaches the 1990's: Where Are We Now?, 23 LOY. L.A.L.
Rev. I, 5-58 (1989) (symposium).
193 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 233-41 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 300-05 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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c. Normative Approach
Another independent judicial approach to the determination
of the "evolving standards of decency," commentators note, is Jus-
tice Marshall's normative approach.'" Justice Marshall has stated
that he does not accept state death penalty legislation as conclusive
of the "evolving standards of decency." 95 Rather, he suggests that
the constitutionality of capital punishment rests upon whether an
informed citizenry would reject it. 196
Justice Marshall developed his normative approach in his con-
curring opinion in the 1972 case of Furman v. Georgia.'" The Furman
Court, in a brief 5-4 per curiam opinion, held that the imposition
of the death penalty in the three cases argued and decided consti-
tuted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments.'" Each of the nine Justices expressed his
view in a separate opinion. 199 Under his normative approach, justice
Marshall concluded that the death penalty was per se unconstitu-
tional.m°
In Furman, Justice Marshall argued that the general public
would find the death penalty "unwise" if informed of the following
factors:
[Tihat the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent
than life imprisonment, that convicted murderers are
rarely executed, but are usually sentenced to a term in
prison; that convicted murderers usually are model pris-
oners, and that they almost always become law-abiding
citizens upon their release from prison; that the costs of
executing a capital offender exceed the costs of impris-
oning him for life; that while in prison, a convict under
sentence of death performs none of the useful functions
that life prisoners perform; that no attempt is made in
the sentencing process to ferret out likely recidivists for
execution; and that the death penalty may actually stim-
ulate criminal activity. 20 '
'94 See Radin, supra note 24, at 1039.
395 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
I" Furman, 408 U.S. at, 361 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Id. at 361-69 (Marshall, J., concurring).
399 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40 (per curiam).
199 Id. at 240-470 (nine separate opinions).
2913 Id. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring).
701 Id. at 362-63 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Justice Marshall also contended that if knowledge of those factors
did not convince the public of the unacceptability of the death
penalty, knowledge of the following factors would: the discrimina-
tory imposition of capital punishment against certain identifiable
classes of people; evidence of the executions of innocent people;
and the havoc the death penalty has wreaked with the criminal
justice system. 202 Knowledge of these factors, Justice Marshall ar-
gued, would shock the average citizen's conscience and sense of
justice, which would therefore render capital punishment uncon-
stitutional under the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine. 203
Commentators note that Justice Marshall's approach is vulner-
able to criticism because it seems to require the Court to substitute
its own opinion of what people should feel for what they actually
do fee1. 204 Moreover, in Furman, Justice Marshall himself acknowl-
edged the argument that legislation authorizing the death penalty
is a satisfactory reflection of the public's will because the legislature
is the voice of the people. 205 He also acknowledged the argument
that persons remain uninformed of the death penalty's attributes
by choice. 206 This choice of ignorance, he noted, might reflect the
public's lack of concern over the death penalty, and hence, the
public's acceptance of it. 207
In Furman, however, Justice Marshall countered the above ar-
guments by contending that the normative approach is desirable
because it forces the Court to acknowledge that its Justices have not
gone through life in a vacuum.208 Additionally, in Gregg he cited a
study conducted to test his approach as evidence that an informed
public would find capital punishment unacceptable. 209 Finally, he
argued that this approach would make it less likely that the status
quo would remain as a result of ignorance or indifference."' Justice
2"2 Id. at 363-64 (Marshall, J., concurring).
"3 Id. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring).
204 See Radin, supra note 24, at 1040; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 444 (1972)
(Powell, J., dissenting) (the normative approach asks that the Court "rest a far-reaching
constitutional determination on a prediction regarding the subjective judgments of the mass
of our people under hypothetical assumptions that may or may not be realistic").
2°5 Furman, 408 U.S. at 361 n.145 (Marshall, J., concurring).
2°" Id. at 362 n.145 (Marshall, J., concurring).
207 Id.
"" Id. at 369 n.163 (Marshall, J., concurring).
299
 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Sarat &
Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hy-
pothesis, 1976 Wis. L. REV. 171).
410 Furman, 408 U.S. at 362 n.145 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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Marshall, therefore, has endorsed a normative independent judicial
approach to the determination of the "evolving standards of de-
cency."
d. Compelling State Interest/Least Restrictive Means Approach
Although a majority of the United States Supreme Court has
not considered the constitutionality of the death penalty under a
compelling state interest/least restrictive means approach, a type of
analysis the Court has used when considering the substantive due
process strand of the fourteenth amendment, a number of scholars
have argued that the Court should adopt this approach in place of
prior eighth amendment analysis in the death penalty context. 211
These scholars contend that if the Court were to resort to a strict
scrutiny approach when determining the constitutionality of the
death penalty, its action would be sound. 212 They note that under
such an approach, the Court would abolish the death penalty only
if another punishment, like life imprisonment, would serve the goals
of penology as well as capital punishment while infringing less on
the constitutional rights of prisoners. 2 n
Briefly stated, the Court's strict scrutiny method of review un-
der the substantive aspect of the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause is that when "fundamental rights" are involved, the state
may justify the regulation of such rights only by a "compelling state
interest," and the state must use the least onerous means to further
its legitimate interests. 214 In Trop v. Dulles, in which the Court con-
sidered whether denationalization as punishment for war-time de-
sertion was cruel and unusual, the Court reasoned that the govern-
ment's appropriation of the defendant's "fundamental right of
citizenship" compelled the Court to examine the punishment with
"special diligence." 215 The Court has also stated that rights explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution are fundamenta1. 216
211 See, e.g., Goldberg Sc Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1796-97; Radin, supra note 24, at
1029-30; Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1268, 1325, 1353 (1968).
Although a majority of the United States Supreme Court has not specifically endorsed a
compelling state interest/least restrictive means approach, in Weems v. United States, the Court
did support its reasoning by suggesting that a less severe punishment would serve the
government's interest. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910).
ptx Radin, supra note 24, at 1014.
213 Comment, supra note 211, at 1325.
214 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
"3 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion).
213 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 33-34 (1973)
(education not a fundamental right).
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Commentators contend, therefore, that the Constitution's refer-
ences to "life" in the fifth and fourteenth amendments are arguably
enough to demand application of a strict scrutiny approach to the
determination of the constitutionality of the death penalty. 217
Commentators also argue that the irrevocability of the death
penalty demands that the Court examine its constitutionality under
a heightened standard of review. 218 They note that in other contexts
when irrevocability was a factor, the Court has engaged in strict
scrutiny. 219 For example, in the 1942 case of Skinner v. Oklahoma,
the United States Supreme Court invoked strict scrutiny under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and held that
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act was an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of an offender's fundamental rights to marriage
and procreation.22° Commentators suggest that at a minimum, Skin-
ner stands for the proposition that to deprive even a felon of basic
rights, the state must show more than a rational basis for its deci-
sion.221 They contend, furthermore, that the death penalty's irrev-
ocability makes strict scrutiny an appropriate standard of review
because of the inherent risk of error that accompanies all judicial
decisions. 222
2 " Comment, supra note 211, at 1325 & n.497. One commentator has noted that Justice
Stone's famous footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938), is also an applicable justification for the Court to apply strict scrutiny to the consti-
tutionality of the death penalty because a specific provision of the Bill of Rights is involved,
and it is unlikely that the persons needing the protection of the eighth amendment are able
to utilize the political process to protect their interests. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1971
Term, 86 HARV. L. Rev. 50, 82 (1972).
212 Radin, supra note 24, at 1029-30; see also Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242,
246 & n.2, 339 N.E.2d 676, 678-79 & n.2 (1975).
"9 Radin, supra note 24, at 1023.
220 316 U.S. 535, 536-38, 541 (1942). In addition to invoking strict scrutiny in contexts
where irrevocability was a factor, the Court has invoked strict scrutiny when a class was
absolutely deprived of a right because of characteristics for which the class was not respon-
sible. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982) (strict scrutiny analysis applied to
public school system's exclusion of illegal alien children despite the Court's holding in San
Antonio indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973), that the right to education
was not fundamental).
221 Comment, supra note 211, at 1359.
222 Radio, supra note 24, at 1017, 1029. Radin explained the relationship between fun-
damental rights, irrevocability, and the strict scrutiny standard of review as follows:
When crucial individual interests are at stake, many of which are enumerated
in the Bill of Rights, our system recognizes that it is often better to risk error
on the side of the individual. Given that prima facie recognition, the extent to
which error on the side of the individual should be risked may, in cases where
the gravity factor is not peremptory, depend on the demonstrable strength and
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An understanding of the permissible goals of penology, com-
mentators note, is critical to a compelling state interest/least restric-
tive means approach because the state's justification for imposing
the death penalty must be based upon how effectively the death
penalty serves these goals in relation to less severe penalties like life
imprisonment. 223 Commentators argue that to remain constitu-
tional, the death penalty must serve a penal goal other than mere
retribution more effectively than life imprisonment. 224 They reason
that if retribution alone were the measuring stick, the state could
justify torturous punishments, such as boiling in oil, on the theory
that it would accomplish retribution more effectively than any other
punishment.225 Furthermore, they note that if the Court was to take
a strict scrutiny approach when determining the constitutionality of
the death penalty, it would most likely hold that the death penalty
was unconstitutional because the state would probably be unable to
justify its imposition of the death penalty due to the difficulty with
proving the utilitarian value of capital punishment. 226
Some members of the United States Supreme Court have ar-
gued for a compelling state interest/least restrictive means approach
in the death penalty context. For example, in Furman, Justice Mar-
shall noted that a compelling state interest/least restrictive means
approach to the cruel and unusual punishments clause would differ
from one under the clue process clause only in that the analysis
would focus on necessity, not rationality. 227 He then suggested that
the Court should require the state to show a compelling interest to
justify the retention of the death penalty because capital punish-
ment deprives a person of the fundamental right of life. 228
Justice Brennan's Furman concurrence contains another ex-
ample of an argument for compelling state interest/least restrictive
means analysis in the death penalty context.229 In Furman, Justice
certainty of the countervailing governmental interests, This appears to be the
kernel of the compelling state interest doctrine.
Id. at 1021.
For examples of mistakenly imposed executions, see Miscarriages of Justice and the Death
Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 234-41 (H. Bedau ed. 3d ed. 1982).
222 Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1796.
294 id. at 1797.
2" id.
2" See, e.g., id. at 1796-98; Comment, supra note 211, at 1364.
227 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,359 n.141 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
222 Id.
229 1d. at 301-05 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Brennan reasoned that the death penalty was unconstitutional be-
cause evidence of the deterrent effect of execution was inconclu-
sive. 23° Moreover, commentators suggest that Brennan implicitly
argued that there was a fundamental "right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment" that required strict scrutiny when legis-
lation threatened it. 231 In addition, they reason that Justice Brennan
argued that it should be the state's burden to prove that legitimate
penal purposes mandate retention of the death penalty. 232
Other members of the Court, however, have not endorsed a
compelling state interest/least restrictive means approach in the
death penalty context. For instance, Chief Justice Burger, in his
Furman dissent, argued against the strict scrutiny approaches sug-
gested by Justices Marshall and Brennan by stating that shifting the
burden to the states would only provide an "illusory solution to an
enormously complex problem." 2" Furthermore, he argued that if
the Court took this approach, all punishments would be suspect to
being cruel and unusual. 234 If this was true, he argued, the Court
might have to require the state to show by convincing proof that a
$5 parking ticket is not as effective a deterrent as a $10 parking
ticket. 235
Burger's argument assumes, commentators note, that all eighth
amendment challenges should be brought under a compelling state
interest/least restrictive means approach. 236 They suggest that one
flaw in Burger's argument is that the Court has never applied one
standard of review to all cases. 237 They also suggest that his fear of
unjust burden on the states would disappear if the Court articulated
consistent principles to justify different adjudicatory approaches. 238
One state court has undertaken a compelling state interest/least
restrictive means approach in relation to the death penalty. In the
2S° Id. at 301-02, 305 (Brennan, J., concurring) (additional factors contributing to the
death penalty's unconstitutionality were that it was unusually severe and degrading, it was
probably inflicted arbitrarily, and most of contemporary society had rejected it).
"' Radin, supra note 24, at 1005 n.68; see Furman, 408 U.S. at 268-69 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
"2 Radin, supra note 24 at 1005; see Furman, 408 U.S. at 279-82 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(punishment unconstitutionally severe if there is no reason to believe the punishment serves
penal purposes more effectively than less severe penalty).
2" Furman, 408 U.S. at 396 (Burger, CT, dissenting).
234 Id.
257 Id.
256 Radin, supra note 24, at 1012.
Id. at 1013.
232 Id.
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1975 case of Commonwealth v. O'Neal, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, in an unsigned order, held that the mandatory death
sentence for murder committed in the course of rape or attempted
rape was repugnant to the Massachusetts Constitution. 239 In a de-
tailed concurring opinion, Chief Justice Tauro, by applying strict
scrutiny analysis to the issue presented, reasoned that the state had
failed to justify its imposition of the death penalty because it had
failed to prove that the death penalty was a more effective punish-
ment than life imprisonment. 240 The state, therefore, had not
chosen the least restrictive means necessary to accomplish its legit-
imate penal goals, and Chief justice Tauro concluded that the man-
datory death sentence for murder committed during the course of
a rape or attempted rape was repugnant to the Massachusetts Con-
stitution.24 ' Three other Justices, in their own concurring opinions,
agreed with portions of the reasoning of Chief Justice Tauro. 242
241 369 Mass. 242, 243, 339 N.E.2d 676, 677 (1975) (per curiam). Five justices wrote
concurring opinions, and two justices dissented. Id. at 244, 339 N.E.2d at 677.
Following the O'Neal decision, the Massachusetts legislature amended article XXVI in
1982 to include the following addition:
No provision of the Constitution, however, shall be construed as prohibiting
the imposition of the punishment of death. The general court may, for the
purpose of protecting the general welfare of the citizens, authorize the impo•
sition of the punishment of death by the courts of law having jurisdiction of
crimes subject to the punishment of death.
MASS. CoNs .r. art. XXVI (as amended by the sixteenth article of the amendments to the
Massachusetts Constitution). In the 1984 case of Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, however, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court again invalidated the state death penalty statute, this
time on the ground that it violated article XII as amended by impermissibly burdening a
defendant's rights to trial by jury and against self-incrimination. 393 Mass. 150, 153, 470
N.E.2d 116, 118 (1984).
2" O'Neal, 369 Mass. at 263, 339 N.E.2d at 687-88 (Tauro, C.J., concurring). Chief
Justice Tauro's conclusion that the mandatory death sentence was unconstitutional was based
on articles I, X, XII, and XXVI of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. /d. (Tauro,
concurring).
Article I of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights provides in part that "all people are
born free and equal and have certain natural, essential and unalienable rights; among which
may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives." MASS. CONST. art. I. Article
X provides in part that "each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the
enjoyment of his life." MASS. CONST. art. X. Article XII provides in part that "no subject
shall be ... deprived of his life but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."
MASS. CoNs-r. art. XII. Article XXVI provides in part that "no magistrate or court of law,
shall demand excessive bail or sureties, impose excessive fines, or inflict cruel or unusual
punishments." MASS. CONST. art. XXVI.
141 369 Mass. at 263, 339 N.E.2d at 687-88 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
2" See id. at 274-75, 339 N.E.2d at 693-94 (Hennessy, J., concurring); id. at 276-78,
339 N.E.2d at 694-96 (Wilkins, J., concurring); id. at 278-79, 339 N.E.2d at 696 (Kaplan,
J., concurring).
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Chief Justice Tauro justified his compelling state interest/least
restrictive means approach by reasoning that the natures of capital
punishment and the right of life compelled the court to apply strict
scrutiny.245
 He noted that life is a fundamental right, and that capital
punishment is a complete and irrevocable deprivation of that
right. 244
 Thus, he reasoned that it was appropriate to place the
burden of justifying the constitutionality of the death penalty on
the state. 245
Chief Justice Tauro recognized that the state has vital interests
in deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution. 246
 He argued that the
evidence the state had introduced to support the deterrent effect
of the death penalty was at best equivocal. 247
 He also reasoned that
the death penalty is unnecessary to incapacitate an offender, and
that this state interest could be accomplished by less onerous
means. 248
 Furthermore, he noted that retribution could not act as
the sole justification for the mandatory death penalty, and that it
was impossible to assess the degree of punishment necessary to
accomplish the goal of retribution. 249
 He reasoned, therefore, that
any marginal benefit the use of capital punishment might have in
serving the state's interest in retribution was insufficient to satisfy
the state's burden under a compelling state interest/least restrictive
means approach. 25° Hence, Chief Justice Tauro concluded that un-
der this approach, the mandatory death penalty was unconstitu-
tional under the Massachusetts Constitution. 251
As mentioned above, a majority of the United States Supreme
Court has not adopted a compelling state interest/least restrictive
means approach to determine the "evolving standards of decency."
The Court has instead stated that the legislature's selection of pun-
ishments are presumed valid, and that the legislature does not have
to select the least severe penalty as long as the penalty otherwise
comports with the dictates of the eighth amendment. 252 Critics of
the death penalty, the Court has noted, must therefore overcome a
24!
	 at 245-46, 339 N.E.2d at 678 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
244 Id. at 245-46 & n.2, 339 N.E.2d at 678 Sc n.2 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
245 Id. at 246, 339 N.E.2d at 678-79 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
246 1d. at 251, 339 N.E.2d at 681 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
249
	 at 258, 339 N.E.2d at 685 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
248
	 at 260, 339 N.E.2d at 686 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
249
	 at 261-62, 339 N.E.2d at 686-87 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
25° Id. at 263, 339 N.E.2d at 687 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
25 ' Id. at 263, 339 N.E.2d at 688 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
252 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Sc Stevens,
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heavy burden to invalidate the constitutionality of capital punish-
ment.255
In sum, the United States Supreme Court has taken a number
of different approaches when it has interpreted the cruel and un-
usual punishments clause of the eighth amendment. The early
Court primarily adhered to an historical method that defined the
prohibition of the clause according to the beliefs of the framers of
the amendment. 254
 From the beginning of the twentieth century,
the Court has interpreted the clause's prohibition more expansively.
Under the "evolving standards of decency" doctrine, the Court has
attempted to define the meaning of the eighth amendment in re-
lation to societal views on the meaning of what is cruel and unusual
punishment. 255 The Court, however, has taken varying approaches
to determining the "evolving standards of decency," particularly in
the death penalty context. The Court's debate surrounding these
varying approaches, and that concerning the proper role of the
Court in the interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause, continued in the Court's decisions examining the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty for minors and the mentally re-
tarded. 256
IL JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE'DEATH
PENALTY FOR JUVENILES AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED
The preceding sections have outlined some of the approaches
that the United States Supreme Court, its individual Justices, a state
court, and legal scholars have taken in attempts to define appro-
priately the "evolving standards of decency" for eighth amendment
purposes. In the 1989 decisions of Stanford v. Kentucky and Penry v.
Lynaugh, members of the United States Supreme Court again took
differing approaches to the determination of the "evolving stan-
dards of decency."257
 Although in both cases a majority of the Court
stated that it was appropriate to engage in some independent
263 Id.
2" See supra notes 43-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's historical
approach to eighth amendment interpretation.
455 See supra notes 71-210 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "evolving
. standards of decency" doctrine.
"6
 See infra notes 257-461 and•accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's deci-
sions regarding the constitutionality of the execution of minors and the mentally retarded.
257
	 Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934
(1989).
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dicial approaches, four members of the Court argued that the his-
torical and contemporary consensus approaches should be the
Court's sole interpretive guide. 258 The remainder of this section will
illustrate this conflict by presenting the Court's decisions concerning
the constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles and the men-
tally retarded.
A. The Death Penalty for Juveniles
In the United States Supreme Court's two cases considering
the constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles, a plurality
of the Court in each case approached the issue differently. In a
1988 decision, Thompson v. Oklahoma, a plurality of the United States
Supreme Court held that the cruel and unusual punishments clause
of the eighth amendment prohibited the execution of a person for
a crime he or she committed before age 16. 259 In another decision
involving the death penalty for juveniles, the 1989 decision of Stan-
ford v. Kentucky, a plurality of the Court held that the cruel and
unusual punishments clause did not prohibit the execution of a
person for a crime he or she committed at 16 or 17 years of age. 26°
In Thompson, the plurality reached its holding by using contempo-
rary consensus, and independent proportionality and utilitarian
excessiveness approaches. 261 In Stanford, the plurality reached its
holding by adhering to historical and contemporary consensus ap-
proaches. 262 Thus, in cases involving defendants separated in age
by just a few months, the Thompson and Stanford pluralities disagreed
as to the proper method of determining the "evolving standards of
decency," as well as the proper role of the Court in eighth amend-
ment adjudication.
"a See Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980 (plurality opinion) (four Justices reasoned that the
Court should only evaluate punishments according to the historical and contemporary con-
sensus approaches); see also id. at 2981 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (one Justice disputed
plurality's rejection of proportionality analysis); id. at 2982 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (four
Justices applied proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness analysis); Peary, 109 S. Ct. at
2955-58 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (one Justice applied proportionality and utilitarian exces-
siveness analysis); id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., concurring in part) (two Justices applied propor-
tionality and utilitarian excessiveness analysis); id. at 2963 (Stevens, J., concurring in part)
(two Justices applied proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness analysis); id. at 2964 (Scalia,
J., dissenting in part) (four Justices rejected appropriateness of proportionality and utilitarian
excessiveness analysis).
2" Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2700 (1988) (plurality opinion).
26° Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980.
25L
 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2963-2700.
2" Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980.
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1. Thompson v. Oklahoma
The United States Supreme Court squarely considered the con-
stitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles for the first time in
the 1988 case of Thompson v. Oklahoma. 205 In Thompson, a plurality
of the Court held that the eighth amendment prohibited the exec-
ution of a person for a crime he or she committed before age 16. 2"
In reaching its holding, the Court considered a number of factors
to determine whether the "evolving standards of decency" pros-
cribed the execution of juveniles at this age. 263
In Thompson, 15-year-old William Wayne Thompson, with the
aid of three older persons, brutally murdered his former brother-
in-law.266 The motive behind the murder was that the victim had
physically abused Thompson's sister. 267 Approximately four weeks
after the murder, the victim's body, chained to a concrete block,
was found in a river. 268 The recovered body had two gunshot
wounds, cuts on the abdomen, chest, and throat, multiple bruises,
and a broken leg. 269
After Thompson's arrest, the Grady County District Court con-
ducted a hearing and found probable cause that he had committed
first-degree murder."° Because Oklahomd law defined Thompson
as a "child," the district attorney petitioned the court to certify that
Thompson be tried as an adult. 27 ' The trial court granted the
district attorney's request, reasoning that there was essentially no
hope for the rehabilitation of Thompson within the juvenile justice
system. 272
At trial, a jury found Thompson guilty of first-degree mur-
der. 273 During the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found as an
263 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2689-2700. In the 1982 case of Eddings v. Oklahoma, the United
States Supreme Court also considered the validity of a 16-year-old juvenile offender's death
sentence. 455 U.S. 104, 109 (1982). Without deciding the constitutionality of executing
juvenile offenders, the Court held that age was one appropriate mitigating factor to be
considered before the death penalty was imposed. Id. at 116. •
234 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2700.
203 Id. at 2691-92; see Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: Debating the Constitutionality of
Juvenile Executions, 16 PEPPERD1NE L. REV. 737, 744 (1989).
266 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690.
267
	 at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
363 Id. at 2690.
263 Id.
273 Id. at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" 1 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2690 (1988) (citing OK/A. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1112(b) (West 1987)).
272 Id.
"3 Id. at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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aggravating circumstance that "the murder was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel" and fixed Thompson's punishment at death. 274
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Thompson's
conviction and sentence, noting that it was constitutionally permis-
sible to punish a minor as an adult once he or she was certified to
stand trial as an adult. 275
 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the death penalty constituted cruel
and unusual punishment for a 15-year-old offender. 276
Justice Stevens delivered the Thompson plurality opinion, in
which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined. 277 The
plurality first noted that the Court's guiding principle to the eighth
amendment issue was a determination of the "evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."278 The
plurality explained that it would first review relevant state legisla-
tion, and then jury sentencing behavior, to resolve the eighth
amendment issue. 279
 It then stated, however, that it would subse-
quently explain why that empirical data confirmed the Court's judg-
ment that a person 15 years of age at the time of his or her crime
was incapable of acting with the necessary degree of culpability to
justify a sentence of death. 28° To support its reasoning, the Thompson
plurality cited Coker as standing for the proposition that "in the end
our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the
acceptability of the death penalty."28 ' Therefore, the plurality es-
tablished that its approach to the determination of the "evolving
standards of decency" would begin with a contemporary consensus
approach, but end in an independent judicial approach. 282
In considering state legislation, the Thompson plurality noted
that all states have statutes that distinguish between children and
274 Id. at 2690. The prosecutor also asked the jury to find that the defendant was a
continuing threat to society because of the likelihood that he would commit violent criminal
acts in the future. Id.
275
	 at 2690-91.
1713 /d. at 2691. The Court also granted certiorari to consider whether photographic
evidence, that a state court ruled erroneously admitted but harmless at the guilt phase,
violated a capital defendant's constitutional rights. Id. The Court found it unnecessary to
reach this second issue given its disposition of the eighth amendment issue. Id. at 2700 n.48.
277 Id. at 2689.
2" Id, at 2691 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
279
	 at 2691-92.
22r} Id,
281 Id. at 2692 n.8 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977) (plurality opin-
ion)).
282 See id. at 2691-92.
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adults."' Furthermore, it observed that in almost all of the fifty
states and the District of Columbia, persons under 16 are unable to
vote, or to drive a car, or marry without parental consent.'" Most
relevant, the plurality noted, was that no state had a statute setting
the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction at less than 16. 28'
The plurality reasoned that legislation such as this reflected man-
kind's experience that normal 15-year-olds were not capable of
assuming the totality of adult responsibilities. 286
In considering state death penalty legislation, the Thompson
plurality reasoned that most states had not expressly considered a
minimum age for the death penalty. 287
 To support its reasoning, it
noted that although most states had waiver statutes that allowed
juveniles accused of serious offenses to be transferred from juvenile
court to criminal court, fourteen states did not authorize capital
punishment at all, and out of the remaining states, nineteen had
not expressly set a minimum age for a sentence of death. 288 The
Thompson plurality reasoned that the statutes of those nineteen states
should be put aside , because those statutes did not focus on the issue
at hand.289 Confining its attention to the eighteen states that had
set a minimum age in their death penalty statutes, the plurality
noted that no state had set a minimum age lower than 16 at the
time of the capital offense. 29°
The next empirical evidence of the "evolving standards of de-
cency" that the Thompson plurality surveyed was the views of profes-
sional organizations and of other nations."' It noted that the Amer-
ican Bar Association and the American Law Institute opposed the
execution of juveniles. 292
 Additionally, it noted that the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union, all countries au-
thorizing the death penalty, prohibited juvenile executions. 295
" 3 See id. at 2692-93.
/04 Id.
" 5 Id. at 2693.
2"0 Id.
w' Id. at 2693-94.
298 Id. at 2694-95.
969 Id. at 2695.
190 Id. at 2695-96.
291 Id, at 2696.
292 Id,
293 Id. The Thompson plurality also noted that West Germany, France, Portugal, the
Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian countries had abolished capital punishment, and
that Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland had retained capital punishment only for excep-
tional crimes such as treason. Id.
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Continuing its search for the public's views on the execution of
juveniles, the Thompson plurality considered jury sentencing behav-
ior. 294 The plurality noted that according to one scholar's data re-
garding minors, eighteen to twenty executions of offenders under
the age of 16 had occurred in the twentieth century. 295 It also noted
that the last of these executions occurred in Louisiana in 1948. 296
This data indicated, the plurality reasoned, an "unambiguous con-
clusion" that the community's conscience generally abhorred the
execution of 15-year-old offenders. 297 The Thompson plurality also
noted that according to Department of Justice statistics, juries had
sentenced to death only five persons under 16 at the time of their
offense between 1982 and 1986. 298 Although it admitted that statis-
tics such as those were subject to varying interpretation, the plurality
reasoned that the statistics suggested that the five sentences were
"cruel and unusual in the same way as being struck by lightning is
cruel and unusual." 299 Hence, the plurality reasoned that jury sen-
tencing behavior, like the death penalty legislation of the states
setting a minimum age for the death penalty, and the views of
professional organizations and other nations, supported the view
that there was a contemporary consensus against the execution of
a minor who committed a crime before age 16. 300
The Thompson plurality then considered the constitutionality of
the death penalty for minors by utilizing a form of proportionality
analysis. 30 ' To do so, the plurality considered whether an adult's
standard of culpability should apply to a juvenile. 302 First, it reiter-
ated the general principle that a punishment should be directly
related to a criminal defendant's personal culpability."' Second, it
stated that as a class, adolescents were not as mature and responsible
as adults."4 Consequently, the plurality reasoned that less culpability
should attach to a juvenile than to an adult who committed the
same crime. 305 As additional support for its reasoning, the plurality
294 Id. at 2697.
298 Id. (citing V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 190-208 (1987)).
296 Id. at 2697 & n.37 (citing V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 190-208 (1987)).
297 Id. at 2697.
298 Id.
299 Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
3°° Id. at 2695-97.
3°' See Id. at 2698.
3°2 Id.
"3 Id.
m"
Id. The Court also stated that the underlying philosophy of the juvenile court system
is that children lack criminal responsibility. Id. at 2698 n.41.
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cited various scholarly works on adolescent development as standing
for the proposition that teenagers are less culpable for their crimes
because of their inexperience, lesser education and intelligence, and
tendency to be motivated by peer pressure and emotion.'" There-
fore, the plurality concluded that the personal culpability of a ju-
venile offender did not justify the death penalty.'"
Finally, the Thompson plurality examined the utility of executing
juveniles by considering whether such executions served the "two
principle social purposes" of the death penalty—retribution and
deterrence.'" The plurality reasoned that executing juveniles would
not serve the goal of retribution because of a juvenile offender's
lesser culpability, his or her capacity for growth, and society's fi-
duciary duty to its children,'" In considering the goal of deterrence,
the plurality noted that according to Department of Justice statistics,
about 98 percent of the persons arrested for willful homicide were
over 16 at the time of the crime.") The plurality also stated that
teenage offenders probably did not give any consideration to the
death penalty because the possibility of execution was remote.'"
Furthermore, the plurality reasoned that even if a teenage offender
gave consideration to the death penalty, it was unlikely that he or
she would be deterred knowing how few persons his or her age had
been executed in the twentieth century. 312 Consequently, the plu-
rality reasoned, sentencing persons to death for crimes they com-
mitted under the age of 16 was "nothing more than the purposeless
and needless imposition of pain and suffering" because it would
not contribute to the goals of capital punishment.'" Thus, by using
the contemporary consensus approach, and the independent pro-
portionality and utilitarian approaches, the Thompson plurality held
that the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth amend-
ment prohibited the execution of a juvenile who committed his or
her crime before age 16.' 14
336 Id. at 2699 & n.43.
3°7 Id. at 2698-99.
3°' Id. at 2699-2700 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).
3°3 1d. at 2699.
313 Id. at 2700.
311 Id.
512 Id.
313 1d. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion)). The
Thompson plurality declined the invitation to "draw a line" prohibiting the execution of
persons under 18 at the time of their offense. Id.
"" Id. at 2691-92, 2700.
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In her concurrence in Thompson, Justice O'Connor identified
the reason for the disagreement between the plurality and dissent
as being their different evaluations of relevant social consensus
evidence. 313 To her, the most persuasive statistic in support of the
Court's holding was that all the state legislatures that had set a
minimum age in their death penalty statutes had chosen 16 or
above.3 ‘ 6 She reasoned that those eighteen states, when combined
with the fourteen that had abolished the death penalty entirely,
made it clear that almost two-thirds of the States had expressly
concluded that persons under 16 at the time of their offense did
not deserve the death penalty. 37 She also argued that the nineteen
states that had not set an age limit in their death penalty statutes
might not have considered the issue. 318
Justice O'Connor stated that this evidence did not, however,
convince her of a national consensus against executing persons
under 16 at the time they committed their crime. 319 Thus, she too
considered jury sentencing behavior and execution statistics in an
effort to determine the public's views. 320 She noted that the plural-
ity's treatment of these statistics supported the inference that there
was a national consensus opposing the death penalty for 15-year-
olds, but stated that this evidence also did not resolve the issue."'
Rather, she argued that without knowledge of how many prosecu-
tors had asked juries to impose the death penalty on persons below
16 at the time of their crimes, it was improper to infer that juries
were more reluctant to sentence those persons to death than simi-
larly situated older defendants. 322
Justice O'Connor also argued that the Thompson plurality's pro-
portionality analysis did not properly resolve the issue" She stated
that even if adolescents were generally less blameworthy than adults,
it was not necessarily true that all 15-year-olds lacked the requisite
culpability that justified capital punishment."' Additionally, she dis-
agreed with the plurality's treatment of the utility of executing
019 Id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
516 Id.
' 17
 Id.
318 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2707 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99 Id. at 2708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
320 Id.
'2 ' Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Id.
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juvenile offenders. 325 She argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence to conclude that the possibility of execution would not deter
some 1 5-year-olds."6 Hence, she reasoned, the state legislatures,
rather than the "subjective" judgment of the Court, were better
equipped to determine where to draw a line. 327 Nevertheless, justice
O'Connor agreed with the Thompson plurality that the defendant's
sentence should be vacated because she believed that there was a
"considerable risk" that the Oklahoma legislature, without setting a
minimum age for the imposition of the death penalty, had not
considered the issue.328
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
White, authored the dissenting opinion in Thompson. 329 Justice Scalia
framed the question before the Court as whether there was a na-
tional consensus that no criminal under 16 was mature enough to
receive the death penalty for any crime, even after the individual
consideration of the criminal's circumstances, and the overcoming
of the presumption that the criminal should be tried as a minor. 33°
Justice Scalia prefaced his opinion by stating that there were no
plausible reasons for answering that question in the affirmative."'
In his analysis, Justice Scalia began with an historical approach
to the determination of the constitutionality of executing minors. 332
He noted that historical practice in the United States, in conform-
ance with the common law, did not support the argument that
persons 15 years old at the time of their offense were immune from
capital punishment. 333 Hence, Justice Scalia argued, the Thompson
plurality was forced to rest its holding on the conclusion that the
"evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society" made the defendant's punishment unconstitutional. 334
Before taking a contemporary consensus approach to the assess-
ment of society's standards of decency, Justice Scalia stated that
state legislation was the most reliable indicator of society's views. 335
325 Id. at 2708-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
"6 Id.
527 1d. at 2709 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
526 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
322 Id. at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"0 Id. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
" I Id.
"2 Id. at 2714 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
333 Id.
334 Id.
3" Id. at 2715 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Justice Scalia interpreted state death penalty legislation differ-
ently than the Thompson plurality had. 336
 For instance, he argued
that the legislation of all of the states retaining the death penalty,
and not only those setting a minimum age, were relevant."' He
noted that a majority of the states that maintain the death penalty
had not set a minimum age for its imposition."$ Hence, Justice
Scalia argued, it was impossible for the plurality to find any evolved
consensus against the execution of minors in the legislation of this
society. 339
Continuing his attack on the Thompson plurality's contemporary
consensus approach, Justice Scalia criticized the plurality for focus-
ing upon capital execution statistics, rather than upon jury sentenc-
ing behavior.34° He found the small number of juvenile executions
unsurprising, and was unpersuaded that this evidence showed the
existence of a relevant trend."' He argued that individualized sen-
tencing determinations and the general reduction of public support
for the death penalty were more likely the factors contributing to
the rarity of juvenile executions."'
Finally, Justice Scalia criticized the Thompson plurality's propor-
tionality and utilitarian excessiveness analysis."' He stated that the
plurality had misread the Court's prior decisions as standing fOr
the proposition that the Court sat as the ultimate arbiter of the
eighth amendment.'" Prior judicial interpretation of the eighth
amendment, he argued, stood for the proposition that a punish-
ment was cruel and unusual if the framers of the eighth amendment
or our current national society considered it cruel and unusual. 345
He contended that the plain meaning of the phrase cruel and
unusual mandated that the evolving standards appropriate for con-
sideration were those entertained by society as a whole, and not
"8 Id. at 2716 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Scalia reasoned that the states that had not set a
minimum age for capital punishment had left their general rules concerning juvenile criminal
responsibility to govern that issue).
"7 Id.
"8 Id.
"9
 Id. The dissent also criticized the plurality's reliance on the laws of other countries.,
Id. at 2716 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the
United States of America we are expounding.").
"° Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
"2 Id.
Id. at 2719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
944
945 Id.
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those dictated by the Justices' personal consciences. 346 Therefore,
Justice Scalia rejected the Thompson plurality's proportionality and
utilitarian excessiveness analysis as well as the plurality's treatment
of empirical data concerning societal views upon the execution of
persons who committed crimes before age 16. 347
Nevertheless, the Thompson plurality's interpretation of the
Court's prior decisions was that the Court had a duty to consider
the constitutionality of the death penalty for a particular class of
offenders under the independent proportionality and utilitarian
excessiveness approaches. 348 Under these approaches, and the con-
temporary consensus approach, the plurality held that the execution
of offenders below the age of 16 was cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the eighth amendment. 349 The Thompson
plurality's analysis therefore reaffirmed the propriety of the pro-
portionality and utilitarian excessiveness strands of eighth amend-
ment jurisprudence.
2. Stanford v. Kentucky
In the 1989 case of Stanford v. Kentucky, one year after its
decision in Thompson, the United States Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of the death penalty when the convicted of-
fender was 16 or 17 years of age at the time of the offense.35° In
Stanford, a plurality of the Court held that this punishment did not
offend the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the eighth
amendment. 35 ' As in Thompson, however, the Court was divided on
the proper mode of determining the constitutionality of the of-
fenders' death sentences, as well as on the proper result.
Stanford involved two consolidated cases. 352 The first case in-
volved Kevin Stanford, who with an accomplice, raped, sodomized,
and murdered a young woman after robbing a gas station where
she worked. 353 Kevin Stanford was approximately 17 years and 4
months of age at the time of his crime. 354
3" Id.
337 See id. at 2716-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting),
3" Id. at 2698 (plurality opinion).
3" Id. at 2691-92.
3" Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969,2972 (1989) (plurality opinion).
" 1 Id. at 2980.
333 Id. at 2972.
333 Id. at 2972-73.
95* Id. at 2972.
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After Stanford's arrest, the juvenile court conducted hearings
to determine whether he should be tried as an adu1t. 355 The juvenile
court found that, in the best interests of Stanford and the com-
munity, trial as an adult was proper. 356 In reaching its decision, the
court stressed the juvenile system's prior lack of success at treating
Stanford for delinquency, as well as the seriousness of his offen-
ses. 357
At trial, a jury convicted Stanford of murder, first-degree so-
domy, first-degree robbery, and receiving stolen property. 3" For his
offenses, the jury sentenced Stanford to death and 45 years in
prison. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his sentence, stating
that an appropriate program of treatment did not exist for Stanford
in the juvenile system and that it was for the jury to consider
mitigating factors such as Stanford's age and possible rehabilitation.
The second case involved Heath Wilkins, who with an accompl-
ice, stabbed to death a woman working behind the counter of a
convenience store she owned and operated with her husband. 359
Wilkins explained that he had planned to murder the person work-
ing behind the counter because "a dead person can't talk." Wilkins
was approximately 16 years and 6 months of age at the time of his
offenses.
After his arrest, the juvenile court held a hearing to determine
whether Wilkins should be tried as an adult. 36° The juvenile court
granted the necessary certification. The court's decision rested on
the brutality of the alleged crime, Wilkins' maturity, and the juvenile
justice system's prior failures at rehabilitating him.
After the Circuit Court of Clay County found Wilkins compe-
tent to stand trial, he waived his right to counsel, intending to plead
guilty and to seek the death penalty."' The circuit court accepted
the waiver and guilty plea. 362 At sentencing, Wilkins told the court
that he wished to receive the death penalty rather than life impris-
onment. 363 The trial court granted Wilkins's wish. 364 Although Wilk-
"3 Id. at 2973.
"6 Id.
,57 Id.
"8 Id.
359 Id.
16u Id.
361 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2991 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id,
3" Id. Wilkins's explanation for his desire to receive the death penalty rather than life
imprisonment was: "[O]ne I fear, the other one I don't." Id.
964 Id.
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ins did not attempt to appeal his death sentence, the Missouri
Supreme Court ordered an evaluation to determine Wilkins's com-
petency, and determined that he was incompetent to waive his right
to appellate counse1. 365 On mandatory review, however, the Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed Wilkins's death sentence by rejecting the
argument that his punishment was cruel and unusual under the
eighth amendment. 366 The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the eighth amendment barred capital
punishment for persons who committed crimes at 16 or 17 years of
age . 367
Justice Scalia delivered the plurality opinion in Stanford, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy
joined. 368 In holding that the eighth amendment does not prohibit
the execution of a 16 or a 17-year-old offender, the Stanford plu-
rality began with an historical approach, and noted that neither of
the petitioners could argue that the ratifiers of the Bill of Rights
had considered such executions cruel and unusual. 369 To support
this contention, the plurality noted that under the common law,
capital punishment could theoretically be imposed on persons aged
7 and above. 37° Additionally, it stated that this country had executed
at least 281 persons under the age of 18. 371 Consequently, the
plurality noted, the petitioners' remaining argument was that their
sentences were in opposition to the "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society." 372
The Stanford plurality prefaced the next phase of its analysis
by reasoning that the Court should determine the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" under a contemporary consensus approach. 373 It
stated that the members of the Court had not in the past found
these "evolving standards" within their own conceptions of decency,
but rather that the Court had previously found these standards in
the views of the entire society.'" Hence, it reasoned, when deter-
365 Id.
366 Id.
"' Id. at 2974 (plurality opinion).
368 Id. at 2972. Justice O'Connor joined in part. Id. at 2980. See infra notes 398-401 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Justice O'Connor's opinion.
559 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2974. Neither of the petitioners had argued that the ratifiers
of the Bill of Rights had considered the execution of juveniles cruel and unusual. Id.
570 Id.
371 Id,
"2 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
"3 Id. at 2974-75.
974 Id.
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mining society's views, the Court should utilize objective factors as
much as possible. 375
 The language of the eighth amendment, with
its prohibition of punishments that are both cruel and unusual, the
plurality stated, as well as the deference the Court owed to the state
legislatures, dictated this approach. 378
The Stanford plurality's contemporary consensus approach to
the constitutionality of the execution of minors began with a con-
sideration of state death penalty legislation. 577
 It noted that of the
thirty-seven states permitting capital punishment, fifteen states did
not authorize capital punishment for 16-year-old offenders, and
twelve states did not authorize capital punishment for 17-year-old
offenders. 578
 This did not, the plurality reasoned, establish that the
nation found it cruel and unusual to execute persons aged 16 or
17 at the time of their crime because a majority of the states that
permitted capital punishment authorized it for crimes the offender
committed at these ages. 379
In considering prosecutorial and jury sentencing behavior, the
Stanford plurality noted that juries had sentenced to death far fewer
offenders under 18 than over 18. 380
 Nevertheless, the plurality
reasoned, the "undisputed fact" that persons over 18 commit more
crimes than those under 18 accounted for this discrepancy. 581
 Fur-
thermore, the plurality reasoned, juries sentenced persons under
18 to death with enough frequency to support strongly the possi-
bility that they believed it should be imposed in rare instances. 582
Therefore, the Stanford plurality reasoned that this evidence was
also not supportive of the conclusion that a societal consensus
against the execution of 16 and 17-year-old offenders existed.383
3" Id. at 2975 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,592 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
376 Id.
377 Id. at 2975-79.
37 ° Id. at 2975.
3" Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2975-76. Justice Scalia noted that in Coker, Georgia was the
sole jurisdiction imposing the death penalty for rape, and in Enmund, only eight jurisdictions
authorized capital punishment for a defendant who neither killed, attempted to kill, or
intended to kill. Id. at 2976. The plurality also noted that although the federal government
had recently passed a statute providing for capital punishment for drug offenders over age
18, there also was a federal statute allowing juveniles to be tried as adults for all federal
offenses. Id. The plurality reasoned that this latter statute contained, If apparent at all," the
broader congressional judgment. Id.
3" Id. at 2977.
"I Id.
31 * Id.
315 Id. at 2979.
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The plurality completed its contemporary consensus analysis
by noting the irrelevancy of statutes setting an age limit of 18 for
activities like driving, voting, and drinking alcoholic beverages. 584 It
reasoned that it was absurd to think that a person needed to be
mature enough to engage in activities like voting before he or she
was mature enough to know that murder is wrong.'" The plurality
also reasoned that those statutes merely represented a societal judg-
ment that the vast majority of persons under 18 were not mature
enough to engage in those activities. 986 Unlike those activities, the
plurality noted, the criminal justice system provided for individual-
ized judicial treatment. 387
The Stanford plurality completed its analysis by rejecting a num-
ber of the dissent's arguments against the imposition of the death
penalty on persons aged 16 or 17 at the time of their offense.'"
First, it stated that public opinion polls, the views of interest groups,
and the positions of professional associations were irrelevant to the
determination of the "evolving standards of decency."'" To support
this contention, the plurality reasoned that before the views of these
groups could constitute a true national consensus against the death
penalty, society's endorsement of these views must have appeared
in society's legislation and application of that legislation."°
Second, the Stanford plurality reasoned that the dissenters were
incorrect to argue that the execution of 16 and 17-year-old offend-
ers did not serve the legitimate goals of penology."' It reasoned
that "socioscientific" evidence concerning the emotional and psy-
chological development of 16 and 17-year-olds did not demonstrate
that these persons always lacked the moral culpability necessary to
satisfy the goal of retribution. The plurality also reasoned that such
evidence did not establish that the death penalty failed to deter
these persons.
Third, the Stanford plurality argued that it had not left political
majorities to define the eighth amendment. 992 The plurality rea-
soned that its analysis was sound because the Constitution was in-
s" Id. at 2977.
3a5 Id.
3" Id.
" 7 id. at 2977-78.
388 Id. at 2979-80.
"9 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979.
"CI Id.
191 Id.
392 Id. at 2980.
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tended to limit the Court, as well as the other governmental
branches. 395
 It also reasoned that the Court's prior cases did not
stand for the proposition that the Justices sat as a "committee of
philosopher-kings." 394 Finally, the plurality noted that although
some of the Court's prior cases had engaged in proportionality
analysis, that sort of analysis, by itself, had never invalidated a
punishment. 393
 Therefore, unable to find a societal consensus
against the execution of 16 or 1 7-year-old offenders under either
an historical or contemporary consensus approach, the Stanford
plurality held that the eighth amendment did not forbid the exec-
utions of these persons.396
In Stanford, Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment of
the Court, but disagreed with parts of the Stanford plurality's anal-
ysis. 397 She did agree with the plurality that there was no national
consensus against allowing the states to impose the death penalty
on persons 16 or 17 at the time of their offense. 398 She did not,
however, agree with the plurality that the Court's inquiry was com-
plete after assessing state death penalty legiSlation. 399 She argued
that the Court had a "constitutional obligation" to conduct propor-
tionality analysis by considering how directly related a punishment
was to a defendant's blameworthiness. 409 Nevertheless, Justice
O'Connor was unconvinced that proportionality analysis would re-
solve the issue, and therefore she concurred with the judgment of
the Stanford plurality."'
Justice Brennan delivered the Stanford dissent, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens."' Justice Brennan agreed
with the Stanford plurality that a determination of the "evolving
standards of decency" should begin with a review of state death
penalty legislation and jury sentencing behavior."' He argued, how-
ever, that the Court should also consider additional state legislation,
as well as ethicoscientific evidence of the psychological and emo-
", Id,
"4 Id.
353 Id.
396 Id.
397 Id. at 2980 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
595 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2981 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
"s Id. Justice O'Connor also argued that state statutes other than those pertaining to the
death penalty were relevant. Id. at 2982 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
4" Id. at 2981 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
4°' Id. at 2982 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
402 Id, at 2982 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4°' Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
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tional development of juveniles. 404
 This additional evidence, he con-
tended, was necessary to determine whether the punishment was
excessive, disproportionate, or failed to serve the legitimate goals
of penology:1°5
In performing his contemporary consensus analysis in Stanford,
Justice Brennan first argued that the plurality had manipulated the
evidence of state death penalty legislation by failing to include the
fifteen "states," including the District of Columbia, not authorizing
the death penalty at all. 406
 He then noted that of the states author-
izing the death penalty, eighteen had not set a minimum age at
which the state could impose it. 407 These eighteen states, Justice
Brennan argued, might not have considered whether the death
penalty would apply to persons under 18 years of age. 408 Hence, he
argued, by combining these eighteen states with the fifteen that had
completely rejected the death penalty, a majority of the states had
rejected the death penalty for juveniles:ft°
Justice Brennan also argued that juries sentenced juveniles to
death so rarely that for juveniles, the death penalty was "un-
usual."41 ° In support of this argument, he noted that in other cases
in which the Court had declared the death penalty unconstitutional,
juries had also rarely imposed the sentence. 4 " To support this
contention, he cited statistics showing that juveniles make up only
about 1.4% of the nation's death row population. 412
 Furthermore,
Brennan argued that the rejection of the death penalty for juveniles
by "respected" organizations, including the American Bar Associa-
tion, and by other countries, were relevant indicators of contem-
porary standards of decency. 413
The Stanford dissent continued its analysis by considering the
proportionality of the death penalty to the blameworthiness of ju-
venile offenders. 414
 It reasoned that state statutes defining 18 as the
legal age for certain activities, such as voting and purchasing por-
nographic materials, reflected society's view that juveniles were not
4" Id.
4°5 Id.
42'1 Id. at 2982-83 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2983 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
4(21 1d.
"" Id. at 2983,2986 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 " Id. at 2984 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
411 Id.
412 Id.
4 " Id. at 2984-85 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'" Id. at 2987-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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as mature or responsible as adults. 4 '' Justice Brennan then cited a
number of factors contributing to the lesser maturity of juveniles,
such as their susceptibility to peer pressure, and their lack of "ex-
perience, perspective, and judgment." 4 ' 6 These factors, Justice
Brennan reasoned, indicated that persons under 18 generally do
not have the same level of responsibility for their actions as do
adults, and thus, that juveniles do not possess the degree of culpa-
bility necessary to uphold the constitutionality of their death sen-
tences under proportionality principles. 4 ' 7
Finally, the Stanford dissent considered whether the death pen-
alty measurably furthered the goals of retribution and deterrence
when it was imposed on juveniles. 418 Justice Brennan reasoned that
the death penalty did not adequately serve the goal of retribution
because juvenile offenders generally lack the same degree of culp-
ability as adults. 4 ' 9 He also reasoned that the death penalty had little
deterrent value to juvenile offenders because of the unlikelihood
that they would consider the possibility of execution, and because
of the tendency of juveniles not to fear death. 42° Hence, by utilizing
the contemporary consensus approach, and the independent pro-
portionality and utilitarian approaches, the Stanford dissent argued
that the execution of persons who committed their offenses before
they reached the age of 18 was excessive and unconstitutional be-
cause it was "nothing more than the purposeless and needless im-
position of pain and suffering. "421
B. The Death Penalty for the Mentally Retarded
On the same day in 1989 that the United States Supreme Court
decided Stanford v. Kentucky, it also considered the constitutionality
of executing a mentally retarded offender with the alleged reason-
ing capacity of a 7-year-old in Penry v. Lynaugh. 422 As in both Thomp-
son and Stanford, the members of the Court were divided on the
appropriate method of resolving the eighth amendment issue. In
415 Id. at 2988 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
415 Id. at 2988-89 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635
(1979)).
4 " Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2989, 2992-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
''s Id. at 2993 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41 ° /d.
420 Id. at 2993-94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 1 Id. at 2994 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977) (plurality opinion)).
444 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2952 (1989).
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Penry, a plurality of the Court adhered to a contemporary consensus
approach and held that the eighth amendment did not categorically
prohibit the execution of mentally retarded offenders. 423
In Penry, the defendant confessed to brutally raping, beating,
and stabbing with a pair of scissors, a woman in her home. 424 He
was charged with capital murder, and a hearing was held to deter-
mine his competency. At this hearing, a clinical psychologist testified
that Penry was mentally retarded, had an IQ of 54, and had been
diagnosed as having organic brain damage as a child, a condition
the psychiatrist testified was probably caused by a trauma to his
brain at birth. This psychologist also testified that Penry had the
mental age of a 6 1/2-year-old, and that his ability to function in
the world was that of a 9 or 10-year-old. Nonetheless, a jury found
Penry competent to stand trial.
At the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, Penry raised an in-
sanity defense and presented the testimony of a psychiatrist who
testified that Penry suffered from organic brain damage, but that
beatings and multiple injuries to his brain as a child may have caused
this condition rather than a trauma to his brain at birth. 425 In this
psychiatrist's opinion, Penry's organic brain damage made it im-
possible for him to understand the wrongfulness of his acts or to
conform with the law. Additionally, Penry's sister testified that their
mother had beaten Penry over the head with a belt on numerous
occasions when he was a child, and that their mother had frequently
locked him in his room for long periods of time without access to
a toilet.
To rebut the testimony of the defendant's witnesses, the state
offered the testimony of two other psychiatrists. 426 One psychiatrist
testified that Penry did not suffer from any mental illness or.defect
at the time of his crime, that he could distinguish right from wrong,
and that he possessed the ability to honor the law. 427 The other
psychiatrist testified that Penry was legally sane at the time of his
crimes, and that he had a "full-blown antisocial personality." Both
of these psychiatrists testified that Penry's mental ability was ex-
423 1d. at 2958 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); see id. at 2964 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
Justice O'Connor, although writing for the various majorities, also reasoned that proportion-
ality and utilitarian excessiveness analysis did not invalidate the defendant's sentence, al-
though no one joined her in this part of her opinion. Id. at 2940, 2955-58.
424 Id. at 2941,
os Id.
* 26 1d. at 2942.
477 Id.
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tremely limited, and that he was incapable of learning from his
mistakes.
The jury found Penry guilty of capital murder. 428
 At the penalty
phase of the trial, the jury sentenced Penry to death. 429 On direct
appeal, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Penry's con-
viction and death sentence. 43° The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider, among other issues, whether the
execution of mentally retarded persons violated the cruel and un-
usual punishments clause of the eighth amendment. 43 '
Justice O'Connor delivered the Court's opinion in Penry. 432
 The
Court's analysis first took an historical approach to the question
presented.4" It noted that the common law had prohibited the
punishment of "lunatics" and "idiots." 484
 It concluded, however, that
because a jury had found the' defendant competent to stand trial,
and had rejected his insanity defense, that this common law pro-
hibition against punishing "idiots" did not apply categorically to
mentally retarded persons. 435
The Penry Court next took a contemporary consensus approach
to determine whether there was any objective evidence of a national
consensus against the execution of the mentally retarded. 436
 It noted
that only one state, Georgia, explicitly banned the execution of such
persons. 437
 It reasoned that this one state, even if added to .the 14
states rejecting capital punishment completely, was not sufficient
evidence to reflect a national consensus against this punishment. 438
425 id.
429 Id. at 2943.
4" Id.
451 Id. at 2943-44. The other eighth amendment issue in Penry was whether the defen-
dant's sentence was improper because the trial judge did not instruct the jury that it could
consider and give effect to mitigating evidence of the defendant's background and mental
retardation. Id. The Court reasoned that the jury's instruction was inadequate and, given its
holding of the principal eighth amendment issue, the Court remanded the case for resent-
encing. Id. at 2952,2958.
4" Pony, 109 S. Ct. at 2940. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and
Kennedy, joined Justice O'Connor in her historical and contemporary consensus approaches
to the eighth amendment issue. Id. at 2940. No one, however, joined Justice O'Connor's
treatment of the issue under the proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness approaches. Id.
4" Id. at 2953-54.
454 Id. at 2954. Under the common law, the term "idiot" was a general description for
persons totally lacking the ability to reason, understand, or distinguish between good and
evil. Id,
435
 Id.
458 Id. at 2955.
4" Id. (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131(j) (Supp. 1989)).
458 Id.
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The Court also noted that public opinion polls and the resolutions
of professional organizations, such as the American Association on
Mental Retardation ("AAMR"), reflected strong public opposition
to the execution of the mentally retarded. 439 These sentiments,
however, had not yet found expression in legislation, and hence,
the Court reasoned, they were not sufficient evidence upon which
it could find a national consensus against capital punishment of the
mentally retarded. 44° The Penry Court therefore concluded that it
could not hold that the execution of the mentally retarded violated
the eighth amendment because there was insufficient evidence of a
national consensus against it."'
Justice O'Connor, now writing only for herself in Penry, com-
pleted her analysis by considering the constitutionality of the ex-
ecution of mentally retarded offenders under the utilitarian exces-
siveness and proportionality strands of eighth amendment
analysis. 442 She noted that although mental retardation would di-
minish a person's criminal culpability, virtually all states authorizing
the death penalty listed as a mitigating factor the defendant's mental
capacity to appreciate his or her criminal acts."' She also argued
that the abilities and experiences of mentally retarded persons vary
greatly. 444 Hence, she reasoned that the possibility that some men-
tally retarded persons were incapable of acting with the level of
culpability necessary to justify the death penalty made it improper
to invalidate the defendant's sentence under either proportionality
or utilitarian excessiveness analysis."'
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Kennedy, concurred in part and dissented in part in
Penry. 446 Justice Scalia agreed with Justice O'Connor that neither an
historical approach nor a contemporary consensus approach ren-
dered the execution of the mentally retarded unconstitutional. 447
He did not, however, agree that the Court should perform propor-
tionality and utilitarian excessiveness analysis to determine the
43° Id.
44° 1d.
441 Id .
' 4 ' Pertly, 109 S. Ct. at 2955-58 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
' 4 ' Id. at 2956 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
444 Id. at 2957 (opinion of O'Connor, J.),
445 ht. at 2956-57 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
"6 Id. at 2963 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). Justice Scalia dissented on the Court's
holding that the trial judge's instructions to the jury were unsatisfactory. Id. at 2964 (Scalia,
J., dissenting in part).
I" Id. at 2963 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
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eighth amendment issue. 448 Justice Scalia argued that these ap-
proaches were improper for the reasons that he had set forth in
Stanford, and stated that the Justices' theories of penology were
irrelevant. 449
Justice Brennan, along with Justice Marshall, also concurred in
part and dissented in part in Penry.45° Justice Brennan agreed with
Justice O'Connor that in determining the constitutionality of the
execution of mentally retarded offenders, the Court should engage
in proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness analysis. 45 ' He disa-
greed, however, with Justice O'Connor's analysis regarding these
two eighth amendment principles. 452 Justice Brennan's reasoning
led him to the conclusion that under both strands of analysis, the
execution of the mentally retarded was unconstitutional. 453
In performing his proportionality analysis in Penry, Justice
Brennan first noted that it was inappropriate to treat all mentally
retarded people as a homogeneous group because of the danger of
stereotyping and discrimination associated with such broad gener-
alizations. 454
 He also noted, however, that according to the AAMR's
clinical definition of mental retardation, all mentally retarded per-
sons had an IQ under 70, and suffered considerable limitations in
learning, personal independence, maturation or social responsibil-
ity.455 Justice Brennan argued that these impairments, as well as the
mentally retarded's marked handicaps in cognitive ability and adap-
tive behavior, limited the culpability of these persons. 456 Hence,
Justice Brennan concluded that the execution of the mentally re-
tarded was a punishment disproportionate to their crimes. 457
In Penry, Justice Brennan also argued that the execution of the
mentally retarded was unconstitutional because it failed to further
the penal goals of retribution or deterrence. 458 He reasoned that
445 Id. at 2969 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
419
45° Id. at 2958 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
" 1 Id. at 2959 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
452 Peary, 109 S. Ct. at 2960 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
455 Id.
454 Id.
"' Id.
4" Id. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Justice Brennan also argued that even if
some mentally retarded persons had an exceptional degree of responsibility, the individual-
ized sentencing considerations still failed to ensure that only these persons received the death
penalty because mental retardation was only one factor that the sentencer considered during
sentencing. Id. at 2961-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
457 Id. at 2961 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
455 Id. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
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because the mentally retarded lack the requisite degree of culpa-
bility necessary to satisfy the proportionality strand of eighth
amendment analysis, the punishment would not effectively serve
the goal of retribution. 459 Additionally, Justice Brennan argued that
the execution of these persons would not satisfy the goal of deter-
rence because nonretarded potential offenders would still be subject
to the death penalty, and the "intellectual impairments" of retarded
potential offenders made it unlikely that the possibility of execution
would deter them. 46° Thus, in his Penry dissent, Justice Brennan
concluded under both the proportionality and utilitarian excessive-
ness strands of eighth amendment analysis that the execution of
the mentally retarded was cruel and unusual punishment. 46 '
In sum, the members of the United States Supreme Court in
Thompson, Stanford, and Penry were unable to agree on the proper
mode of determining the constitutionality of the execution of ju-
veniles and of the mentally retarded. Some of the Justices argued
that the Court should only engage in historical and contemporary
consensus approaches, while others argued that the Constitution
obligated the Court to consider also the validity of these executions
under proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness approaches. The
Thompson, Stanford, and Penry Courts, therefore, have left subse-
quent challengers of the constitutionality of the death penalty to
ponder over what mode of analysis will ultimately prevail in the
Court.
III. ANALYSIS OF PRESENT JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
"EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY" AS APPLIED TO MINORS AND
THE MENTALLY RETARDED
The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the cruel
and unusual punishments clause under an historical approach by
reading the clause as only prohibiting the infliction of punishments
that the framer's of the eighth amendment deemed torturous. 462
For example, the Court in Wilkerson v. Utah held that the eighth
amendment did not prohibit the sentence of death by public shoot-
ing because this mode of execution was historically acceptable. 463 In
1910, however, in Weems v. United States, the Court expanded the
459 Id.
46° Id. at 2962-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
♦01 Id. at 2962 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
"2 See Granucci, supra note 1, at 842.
465 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1879).
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clause's scope by stating that the clause was "not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire new meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane justice." 464
 Forty-eight years later, in Trap
v. Dulles, the Court stated that the eighth amendment was defined
according to the "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." 465
 The Court has subsequently
adopted this notion and rejected the historical approach as its sole
interpretive guide to the cruel and unusual punishments clause. 466
The Court's adoption of the "evolving standards of decency"
doctrine has resulted in several distinct strands of eighth amend-
ment analysis. These strands of analysis include the contemporary
consensus approach, and the independent proportionality and util-
itarian excessiveness approaches. 467
 Combined, these approaches
suggest that a punishment may be constitutionally invalid if popular
sentiment abhors it, if the punishment is disproportionate to the
offender's crime, or if the punishment inadequately serves legiti-
mate penal purposes. 468
 None of these approaches, however, com-
pletely remedies the problem of the Court's appropriate role in
eighth amendment analysis.
For example, the Court's heavy reliance on the contemporary
consensus approach in Gregg v. Georgia rendered the eighth amend-
ment a meaningless prohibition on the states because it allowed the
Court to avoid almost completely any independent role in consid-
ering the constitutionality of capital punishment. 469 By allowing
state death penalty legislation to determine whether the death pen-
alty was cruel and unusual, the Gregg Court allowed political ma-
jorities to determine the scope of one of the protections constitu-
tionalized in the Bill of Rights. 47° This must be improper, for the
Constitution contemplates that the judiciary will act as a check upon
the legislative branches of government. 471
 Moreover, by taking this
approach, the Gregg Court avoided its constitutional duty, mandated
464
 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
465
 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
466 See Granucci, supra note 1, at 842.
467 See supra notes 96-193 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's con-
temporary consensus, proportionality, and utilitarian excessiveness approaches.
4" See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 330-33 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring);
Berkman, supra note 8, at 72.
169 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 174-76, 179-81 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, & Stevens, JJ.); Berkman, supra note 8, at 49.
470
 See Berkman, supra note 8, at 49.
471 See Radin, supra note 24, at 1036.
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by the eighth amendment, to protect the individual from the sub-
jugation of the masses.
On the other hand, when the Court has engaged in the inde-
pendent proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness approaches, it
has actively accepted its role as guardian of constitutional values. 472
The reason for this is that these independent approaches do not
allow the judgments of the states solely to define the proscriptions
of the eighth amendment.473 These approaches also ensure that
criminal defendants are not punished more severely than their acts
warrant, or more than is necessary to contribute to the acceptable
goals of penology.474
For instance, in Enmund v. Florida, the Court's proportionality
and utilitarian excessiveness analyses played important roles in the
Court's decision that death was an unconstitutional punishment for
a robber who neither took life, attempted to take life, or intended
to take life. 475 Under a pure contemporary consensus approach, the
Enmund Court might not have reached the same conclusion because
the states had not unanimously rejected the death penalty for such
a defendant. 476 But by giving serious consideration to the dispro-
portionality of the death penalty to the defendant's crime of rob-
bery, and the unlikelihood that this punishment for a robber would
serve to further society's legitimate penal goals, the Enmund Court
established that the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punish-
ments clause had substantive meaning beyond that encompassed in
the views of state legislatures and juries.
Nevertheless, the independent proportionality and utilitarian
excessiveness approaches have their own shortcomings. Consider
for example the Coker decision, in which the Court held that the
sentence of death was grossly disproportionate to the crime of
rape.477 One may argue that the Coker decision is unprincipled
because the Coker Court based its proportionality analysis on the
subjective views of its individual Justices rather than on traditional
constitutional principles such as deference to the legislature. 478 In
addition, the major problem with the Court's utilitarian excessive-
ness analysis is the inherent difficulty in measuring the deterrent
472 See Berkman, supra note 8, at 66-67.
"5 See id.
474 See id. at 70; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
455 See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-801 (1982).
47 " See id. at 792-93.
477 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
476 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 619 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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and retributive value of capital punishment. Legions of scholarly
works debate the subject, and it is probably impossible for the Court
independently to decide this issue correctly when the vast literature
on the subject is so inconclusive. 479
 Hence, although the Court's
independent proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness ap-
proaches are an important and justified attempt by the Court to
acknowledge its role as guardian of the eighth amendment, these
approaches do not provide the Court with an approach to eighth
amendment analysis that is free from significant criticism.
In sum, the United States Supreme Court's adoption of the
"evolving standards of decency" doctrine was an improvement over
the early Court's adherence to the historical interpretation of the
cruel and unusual punishments clause. The "evolving standards of
decency" doctrine, however, does not contain a single approach that
by itself allows the Court to interpret the eighth amendment in a
way that does not place too much emphasis on the views of the
individual Justices or depend too much on exactly the sort of state
power that the framers of the eighth amendment intended to limit.
The remainder of this note will consider these problems in light of
the present Court's consideration of the death penalty for juveniles
and the mentally retarded, two groups of offenders who are argu-
ably most in need of the eighth amendment's protection because
the views of these groups do not ordinarily find a voice in legislation
or in courts. These cases clearly illustrate that the Court continues
to divide over the scope of the Court's role in eighth amendment
analysis. Moreover, these cases illustrate the need for a more con-
sistent mode of analysis. Hence, this note will consider the Court's
opinions in Thompson, Stanford, and Penry and their possible impli-
cations to the future of eighth amendment jurisprudence. This note
will then propose that to remedy the conflicting views of the mem-
bers of the Court on interpreting the "evolving standards of de-
cency," and to sustain the life of the eighth amendment, the Court
should apply a compelling state interest/least restrictive means anal-
ysis, at least in considering the constitutionality of the death penalty
for juveniles and the mentally retarded.
4" See, e.g., T. SELLIN, THE PENALTY OF DEATH 6 (1980) (author concluded that the death
penalty had no deterrent value); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question
of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397, 416 (1975) (empirical evidence not inconsistent
with theory that capital punishment reduces murder rate); Passel!, The Deterrent Effect of the
Death Penalty: A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. REV. 61, 79 (1975) (author concluded it was
impossible to prove with empirical social science whether executions deter murderers). For
a synopsis of the debate surrounding the utility of executions, see D. HOOK & L. KAHN,
DEATH IN THE BALANCE 41-53 (1989).
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A, Criticism of the Present Court's Treatment of Juveniles and the
Mentally Retarded Under the Eighth Amendment
From the foregoing, one might easily conclude that the most
consistent aspect of the United States Supreme Court's view on its
role in interpreting the eighth amendment and the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" is that its members cannot agree. As the Court's
decisions concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juveniles and the mentally retarded illustrate, this division has con-
tinued to plague the present Court. Consequently, one may criticize
the present Court for ignoring precedent as well as reducing the
constitutional significance of the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments. Hence, it is an understate-
ment to suggest that the Court is sorely in need of a more defined
method of eighth amendment analysis.
For example, consider the analytical inconsistencies in the
Court's two juvenile death penalty decisions, Thompson v. Oklahoma
and Stanford v. Kentucky. 48° In Thompson, a plurality of the Court, by
relying on the contemporary consensus approach, and the indepen-
dent proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness approaches, held
that the execution of persons who committed their offenses before
age 16 was unconstitutional."' One year later in Stanford, a plurality
of the Court, relying solely on the historical and contemporary
consensus approaches, held that the execution of persons who com-
mitted crimes while age 16 or 17 did not violate the Constitution. 482
Although the precise issues in Thompson and Stanford differed only
slightly, the Stanford plurality failed to explain adequately why it
was giving the defendants in that case less of a chance to prove the
unconstitutionality of their sentences than did the Thompson plural-
ity.
The Stanford plurality reduced the possibility that the defen-
dants could prove the invalidity of their sentences in part by refus-
ing to consider the independent proportionality approach to eighth
amendment adjudication that the Court had used in the past. 483 For
example, in Coker v. Georgia and Enmund v. Florida, the Court relied
on proportionality analysis to invalidate the death penalty for a
rapist and for a robber who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend
48o
	
Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989); Thompson v, Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct.
2687 (1988).
48 ' Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691-92, 2700.
442 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2980.
483 See id.
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to ki11.484 Although in Coker all the states but Georgia did not au-
thorize the death penalty for rape, and in Enmund all the states but
eight did not sentence felony murderers to death, the Courts in
those cases stated that this empirical data did not decide the con-
troversy. 485
 Instead, the Coker and Enmund Courts recognized their
constitutional duties to consider independently the proportional
relation between these crimes and the death penalty, a consideration
that ultimately led both Courts to invalidate the defendants' sen-
tences.486 Therefore, by refusing to engage in independent propor-
tionality analysis, the Stanford plurality was ignoring precedent, as
well as making it easier for itself to uphold the defendants' sen-
tences.
In stark contrast to the Stanford plurality, the Thompson plurality
engaged in proportionality analysis to determine whether the ex-
ecution of persons only one year younger than one of the defen-
dants in Stanford was unconstitutional.'" Citing Coker and Enmund,
the plurality in Thompson recognized that the import of those cases
was that the Court cannot interpret the eighth amendment solely
under a contemporary consensus approach because otherwise that
amendment may not adequately protect offenders 488 The Thompson
plurality, therefore, was loyal to the Court's precedents in a way
that the Stanford plurality was not.
Another way that the Stanford plurality diverged from the rea-
soning of the Thompson plurality was by refusing to consider the
independent utilitarian excessiveness approach.'" Coker and En-
mund stand for the proposition that a punishment is excessive and
unconstitutional if it fails to serve society's valid penal goals of
deterrence and retribution. 490 Thompson, which involved essentially
the same issue as Stanford, also stands for this proposition."' With-
out adequate explanation, the Stanford plurality reduced the Court's
eighth amendment doctrine so that it encompassed only the histor-
ical and contemporary consensus approaches. Consequently, the
Stanford plurality failed to give the defendants the same chance at
4" See, e.g., Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797-98 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597-98 (1977) (plurality opinion).
485 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 792-93; Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97 (plurality opinion).
186 See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-98; Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-98 (plurality opinion).
1 B 7 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2698-99 (1988).
4" See id. at 2698 & n.40.
4B9
 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2979 (1989).
49° See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,
592 (1977) (plurality opinion).
491 See Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2700 (plurality opinion).
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avoiding their penalties that the Court had given similarly situated
offenders.
The Thompson and Stanford plurality opinions are also analyti-
cally inconsistent in their treatments of the "evolving standards of
decency" under the contemporary consensus approach. In Thomp-
son, the plurality considered a number of different types of state
legislation, including statutes specifying the legal age for activities
such as driving a car and voting, as well as statutes concerning the
death penalty."' The Thompson plurality also reasoned that jury
sentencing behavior and the views of professional organizations and
foreign countries were relevant. 493 The Stanford plurality, on the
other hand, refused to consider state legislation other than capital
punishment statutes."' Additionally, it reasoned that the views of
foreign countries were irrelevant."' Hence, the Stanford plurality,
by confining its contemporary consensus approach to an examina-
tion of state death penalty legislation and jury sentencing behavior,
again reduced the possibility that the defendants' sentences were
inconsistent with the "evolving standards of decency."
If nothing else, these inconsistencies indicate that the Court is
sorely in need of a more defined method of eighth amendment
analysis. Regardless of one's views on the constitutionality of the
execution of juveniles, this inconsistency is undesirable because it
diminishes the legitimacy of the Court. 496 For example, commen-
tators suggest that the Court's legitimacy turns in part upon its
respect for precedent.497 The Stanford plurality, however, specifically
rejected proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness analysis with-
out adequately distinguishing cases like Thompson and Coker. 498 Al-
though the Stanford plurality noted that in those prior cases, the
objective indicia were more in favor of the Court's proportionality
analysis, the Stanford plurality refused even to consider the propor-
tionality of the crimes and offenders at issue. 499 Hence, the Stanford
plurality's opinion is objectionable and damaging to the Court's
legitimacy because the Stanford plurality neither considered these
strands of analysis, nor squarely confronted them.
"9 Id. at 2692-96.
49" Id. at 2696-97.
4 "4 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2977-79.
499 Id. at 2975 n.1.
"6 See Berkman, supra note 8, at 65 (legitimacy and persuasiveness of Court's decisions
rests on their reasoning in published opinions).
4" Goldberg Sc Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1777,
49" See Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969,2980 (1989).
499 See id.
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The Stanford plurality also damaged the legitimacy of the Court
with its adoption of a completely positivist approach to the inter-
pretation of the eighth amendment. 500
 Allowing states that autho-
rized the execution of juveniles essentially to define the meaning of
the cruel and unusual punishments clause made the eighth amend-
ment's protection meaningless for 16 and 17-year-old offenders. 5°'
Although the remaining five Justices in Stanford (O'Connor, Bren-
nan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) all acknowledged that cases
like Coker, Enmund and Thompson spoke of the Court's constitutional
obligation to perform proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness
analysis, their inability to persuade the plurality indicates that the
eighth amendment is in jeopardy of becoming a meaningless pro-
vision of the Bill of Rights.
Admittedly, Justice Scalia's plurality opinion in Stanford did
contain strong justifications for the plurality's revisionist approach.
For instance, he argued that a literal reading of the cruel and
unusual punishments clause dictated that a punishment was invalid
only if society as a whole rejected it. 502
 Justice Scalia also argued
that because elected representatives pass legislation, state death pen-
alty statutes reflect society's "evolving standards of decency" in re-
lation to the execution of juveniles. 503 Additionally, Justice Scalia
correctly noted that in cases like Coker, where the Court condemned
a punishment under proportionality analysis, the objective indicia
of society's views were more in favor of the invalidity of the death
penalty than were the objective indicia in Stanford. 504
Nevertheless, these arguments are inadequate justification for
allowing the acts of political majorities to define the scope of the
eighth amendment's protection. 505
 For example, it is unclear
whether state death penalty legislation is an accurate reflection of
how the vast majority of citizens feel about executing juvenile of-
fenders. Perhaps, as Justice Marshall suggested under his normative
approach in Furman, citizens who were informed of all the facts
concerning the death penalty would find this punishment unac-
ceptable. 5°6 Under the Stanford plurality approach, however, any
punishment is acceptable as long as enough state statutes say it is.
500 See id. at 2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"I See Berkman, supra note 8, at 49; Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1782.
50 Stanford, 109 S. Ct. at 2979-80.
505 /d. at 2979.
5°4 1d. at 2980.
50' See id. at 2986-87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
505 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 369 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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The Constitution also makes Justice Scalia's arguments in Stan-
ford inadequate justifications for taking a completely positivist ap-
proach to interpreting the cruel and unusual punishments clause.
Under the Constitution, the judiciary is to act as a check on the
legislature. Assuming that the framers of the Bill of Rights intended
to "withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political con-
troversy," the Stanford plurality shirked this duty by returning the
task of defining cruel and unusual punishments to the very major-
ities the framers distrusted. 507 Taken to the extreme, the plurality's
interpretation of the eighth amendment would uphold any sort of
punishment as long as enough states were in favor of it. Therefore,
by revising eighth amendment doctrine, the Stanford plurality failed
to fulfill its role as guardian of the Bill of Rights and of individual
interests.
In Penry v. Lynaugh, the plurality's analysis of the constitution-
ality of executing mentally retarded offenders shares the same de-
fects as the Stanford plurality's analysis. Although Justice O'Connor's
plurality opinion examined the "evolving standards of decency"
under the independent proportionality and utilitarian excessiveness
approaches, the other members of the plurality, by ignoring the
import of cases like Coker and Enmund, argued that these strands of
analysis were improper. 5" These Justices reasoned that the phrase
"cruel and unusual" precluded the Court from injecting the views
of its Justices into eighth amendment analysis, and if legislation and
jury determinations did not reflect society's disapproval of executing
mentally retarded offenders, the Court had no choice but to hold
that such executions were constitutional. 509 Consequently, most of
the Justices concurring in the result of the Penry decision confined
their analysis to the historical and contemporary consensus ap-
proaches. By confining their analysis to these approaches, these
Justices endorsed their view that a completely positivist approach
was proper under the eighth amendment. For the reasons discussed
above, this approach is an assault on the Court's legitimacy as well
as on the vitality of the eighth amendment. Hence, the Penry plu-
rality's analysis is as defective as the Stanford plurality's analysis
507 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, .638 (1943); see Stanford
v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969, 2986-87 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Radin, supra note
24, at 1036.
508 Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 2955-58 (1989) (opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at
2964 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
509 See id. at 2964 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
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because it too ignored precedent as well as the Court's duty to guard
the Bill of Rights and the interests of individuals.
In sum, the present Court's eighth amendment jurisprudence
lacks consistency as well as justification. Even more disturbing, how-
ever, is that Thompson, Stanford, and Penry involved the executions
of persons to whom society owes a fiduciary obligation—juveniles
and the mentally retarded. In light of these decisions, juvenile and
mentally retarded offenders may never get a chance at rehabilita-
tion. Whether they should have this chance is open to debate.
Nonetheless, this debate should be carried out under the Court's
"evolving standards of decency" precedents unless the Court ad-
vances a persuasive argument to justify the revisionist approach of
the Stanford and Penry pluralities.
B. Proposal For Reconsideration
This note has focused on the present Court's treatment of the
constitutionality of the death penalty for juveniles and the mentally
retarded because these offenders, with their obvious immaturity
and lack of participation in the political process, are most deserving
of careful attention under the eighth amendment. As illustrated
above, the present Court has not applied a consistent standard of
review to the sentences of these offenders.m° Perhaps the reason
for this is that each of the Court's prior approaches to eighth
amendment adjudication possesses deficiencies and the Court is not
satisfied that any of the approaches sufficiently resolves the meaning
of the cruel and unusual punishments clause. Thus, to remedy the
deficiencies in current eighth amendment jurisprudence, the Court
should adopt a compelling state interest/least restrictive means ap-
proach to consider the constitutionality of executing juveniles and
the mentally retarded.
If the Court was to take such an approach in these contexts, it
would be able to protect these individuals from execution if that
protection was warranted. The compelling state interest/least re-
strictive means approach would also allow the members of the Court
to refrain from injecting their independent views into eighth
amendment interpretation, and hence, avoid the concern of the
Stanford and Penry pluralities that the independent approaches, like
proportionality and . utilitarian excessiveness analysis, allow the
51 " See supra notes 480-509 and accompanying text for an analysis of the Court's treat-
ment of the execution of juveniles and the mentally retarded.
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Court to sit as a "committee of philosopher-kings." 5 " Furthermore,
this approach would allow the Court to fulfill its constitutional role
as the protector of the Bill of Rights in a way that adherence to a
pure contemporary consensus approach does not. 512 Under this
approach, the states could continue to execute juveniles and the
mentally retarded as long as they could prove that this most severe
punishment was necessary to accomplish the legitimate goals of
penology. 5 "
The Court could justify imposing this burden on the states by
reasoning that execution is an irrevocable deprivation of the fun-
damental right to life guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. 514
 Then, in a manner similar to the Court's strict
scrutiny analysis in Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Court could require the
state to prove an interest in the execution of juveniles and the
mentally retarded that a lesser punishment, like life imprisonment,
did not serve as effectively. 515 In Skinner, the Court reasoned that
the irrevocable effect of Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization
Act on the fundamental rights of marriage and procreation dictated
such an approach. 5 ' 6
 If strict scrutiny was appropriate in Skinner, a
compelling state interest/least restrictive means approach is similarly
the appropriate approach for the Court to take given the irrevocable
effect of the death penalty on juveniles and the mentally retarded.
Hence, the Court would not be overstepping its bounds by adopting
this analysis.
Moreover, the two cases in which the Court established the
"evolving standards of decency" doctrine contained aspects of strict
scrutiny analysis. In Weems v. United States, the Court supported its
conclusion that a 15-year sentence of cadena temporal was cruel and
unusual punishment for the falsification of a single public document
by suggesting that a less severe sentence would adequately serve the
government's interest in punishing the offender. 5" In Trop v. Dulles,
the Court justified its holding that denationalization was cruel and
unusual punishment for war-time desertion by stating that there
was a fundamental right to citizenship and that this mandated the
5 " See Stanford, 1139 S. Ct. at 2980.
512 See id. at 2987 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
513 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 359 n.141 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
5" See id.; Radio, supra note 24, at 1023.
5'5 See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
516 1d.
517 See Weans V. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 381 (1910). See supra notes 75-80 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Weems.
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Court to examine the safeguard of the eighth amendment with
"special diligence." 518 Thus, the Court could find additional justifi-
cation for placing the burden on the states to prove the necessity
of sentencing juvenile and mentally retarded offenders to death by
noting the strict scrutiny aspects of Weems and Trop.
As discussed above, Chief Justice Tauro of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court adopted a compelling state interest/least
restrictive means approach in determining the constitutionality of
the death penalty. 519 In Commonwealth v. O'Neal, Chief Justice Tauro
correctly placed the burden of justifying capital punishment on the
state by reasoning that execution was an irrevocable deprivation of
a person's fundamental right to life. 520 Although the state ultimately
failed to sustain this burden, 52 ' a compelling state interest/least re-
strictive means approach allowed Chief Justice Tauro to give mean-
ing to the state constitution's proscription against cruel or unusual
punishments without overstepping his judicial role or allowing po-
litical majorities complete control in deciding the issue.
Admittedly, if the United States Supreme Court were to follow
the lead of Chief Justice Tauro in O'Neal, the state would have
difficulty justifying the execution of juveniles and the mentally re-
tarded under a compelling state interest/least restrictive means ap-
proach. The states legitimate penal interests are in retribution, de-
terrence, and incapacitation. The state could probably prove that
executing these offenders best serves society's interest in retribution.
But as is evident from the Court's difficulties under utilitarian ex-
cessiveness analysis, 522 it may be virtually impossible for the state to
prove that executing these offenders serves as a superior deter-
rent.'" Furthermore, life imprisonment obviously incapacitates
these offenders as well as execution as long as jails are secure and
the state does not release prisoners prematurely. 524 Therefore, the
51° See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103 (1958) (plurality opinion). See supra notes 81-
88 and accompanying text for a discussion of Trop.
' 19 See supra notes 238-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of the O'Neal court's
application of a compelling state interest/least restrictive means approach to the validity of
the death penalty.
52° See Commonwealth v. O'Neal, 369 Mass. 242, 245-46 & n.2, 339 N.E.2d 676, 678 &
n.2 (1975) (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
52 ' Id. at 263, 339 N.E.2d at 687-88 (Tauro, C.J., concurring).
522 See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems
associated with utilitarian excessiveness analysis.
52! See, e.g., Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1796; Comment, supra note 211, at
1353-54.
644 Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1796.
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state's argument under a compelling state interest/least restrictive
means approach would probably have to rest on the notion that
executing juveniles and the mentally retarded is the best way to
accomplish the compelling state interest of retribution.
One can argue, however, that it is inherent in the logic of the
eighth amendment that a penalty is cruel and unusual if it does not
serve a societal goal other than retribution more effectively than a
lesser penalty. 525
 For example, if the states were to boil juvenile and
mentally retarded murderers in oil, this would probably satisfy
society's desire for retribution more effectively than sentencing
these persons to life imprisonment. 526 But almost everyone would
agree that the eighth amendment and the "evolving standards of
decency" doctrine prohibit this sort of punishment, regardless of
the offender's crime. Moreover, given the lesser culpability of ju-
venile and mentally retarded offenders, and the fiduciary obliga-
tions society owes to these persons, retribution alone should not be
enough to justify the execution of juveniles and the mentally re-
tarded. Hence, one may argue that even the state's interest in ret-
ribution should not be enough to satisfy the Court under a com-
pelling state interest/least restrictive means test that the execution
of juveniles and the mentally retarded is necessary.
In sum, the United States Supreme Court should adopt a com-
pelling state interest/least restrictive means approach when consid-
ering the constitutionality of executing juvenile and mentally re-
tarded offenders. This approach, by placing the burden on the state
to justify these executions, would allow the Court to refrain from
the inherently subjective independent approaches to eighth amend-
ment adjudication such as proportionality analysis. This approach
would also allow the Court to give substantive meaning to the cruel
and unusual punishments clause that a pure contemporary consen-
sus approach, with its emphasis on the views of political majorities,
cannot. Moreover, this approach would prevent the execution of
juvenile and mentally retarded offenders if that punishment is an
unjustified infringement upon the fundamental right to life. Con-
sequently, this approach would preserve the Court's legitimacy as
well as protect the constitutional rights of these individuals, whose
obvious immaturity and lack of participation in the political process
render them most in need of judicial protection.
625 See id. at 1797; O'Neal, 369 Mass. at 261-62,339 N.E.2d at 687 (Thum, C.J., concur-
ring).
"G See Goldberg & Dershowitz, supra note 5, at 1797.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Throughout its history, the United States Supreme Court has
struggled with the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishments
clause, particularly in the context of the constitutionality of the
death penalty. This struggle has generated a number of different
approaches to eighth amendment death penalty analysis, most not-
ably the historical, contemporary consensus, proportionality, and
utilitarian excessiveness approaches. None of these approaches by
itself, however, has allowed the Court to interpret the cruel and
unusual punishments clause in a manner that gives substantive
meaning to the clause, while still maintaining the legitimacy of the
Court.
The Court's analysis concerning the constitutionality of exe-
cuting juvenile and mentally retarded offenders has developed no
differently. The Court's reasoning in these cases is inconsistent and
it reflects the Court's continuing difficulties with the "evolving stan-
dards of decency" doctrine. Most significant in these cases, however,
is the Court's move towards a pure application of the historical and
contemporary consensus approaches. If the Court is to adopt the
Stanford and Penry plurality's interpretations of the eighth amend-
ment, the strength of the amendment's protection may be entirely
lost because the states will be defining the proscriptions of the eighth
amendment rather than the courts.
lf, on the other hand, the Court was to adopt a compelling
state interest/least restrictive means approach to determining the
constitutionality of executing juvenile and mentally retarded of-
fenders, the Court could refrain from basing its analysis on the
inherently subjective independent approaches to eighth amend-
ment adjudication. This approach would also allow the states to
continue to execute these offenders if those executions were nec-
essary for the accomplishment of the state's legitimate penal inter-
ests. Moreover, this approach would give substantive meaning to
the cruel and unusual punishments clause. Thus, the Court's adop-
tion of a compelling state interest/least restrictive means approach
to cruel and unusual punishments analysis, at least in these contexts,
would allow the Court to regain its legitimacy because under this
approach, the Court could fulfill its constitutional role as the guard-
ian of the Bill of Rights.
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